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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the large number of potentially precedential opinions 
issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal 
Circuit or court) in 2010, the government contracts cases—as a 
group—appear to lack significant volume, thematic coherence, or 
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dramatic impact.  Indeed, particularly if the three non-mainstream1 
Winstar and Spent Nuclear Fuel cases are excluded, the court’s 
government contracts output this calendar year seems unusually 
small and highly disaggregated.  Instinct suggests that 2010 will not 
prove a memorable year for Federal Circuit government contracts 
jurisprudence. 
Accordingly, this Article will begin with some scholarly perspective 
on, and empirical quantification of, the Federal Circuit’s level of 
specialization and evolving jurisprudence in the field of government 
contracts.  The article then turns to a hodge-podge of, frankly, 
unrelated cases grouped as follows:  three award controversies (or bid 
protests), a handful of post award performance disputes, a few 
selections from the ongoing behemoths of litigation in the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims—Winstar and Spent Nuclear Fuel, and a potentially 
analogous implied warranty case. 
 The article resists the urge to characterize this relatively small, 
disparate body of work.2  Indeed, I continue to struggle to divine 
                                                 
 1. Forgive this distinction, but, as a general rule, my primary focus lies with the 
more than $500 billion the U.S. government spends annually through Executive 
branch procurement contracts, covered by the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR), 48 C.F.R., and chronicled in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS—
Next Generation), available at https://www.fpds.gov and http://USASpending.gov.  
To elaborate, the conventional world of federal government procurement contracts 
is (1) typically defined by the government’s expenditure of Congressionally-
appropriated funds, and (2) organized in terms of what the government is 
purchasing (e.g., services (human capital and, typically, but not always, also 
research), supplies (or deliverables), and construction (improvements to real 
property)).  Neither the aftermath of the Savings and Loan crisis nor the fallout from 
the Yucca Mountain debacle, both discussed at some length below, fit neatly within 
either model. 
 2. Nonetheless, I applaud the efforts of my predecessors who sought to do so.  
See, e.g., David W. Burgett et al., 2006 Government Contract Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1073, 1115 (2007) (“The Federal Circuit did not issue any 
particularly surprising or innovative rulings on government contracts, although there 
were a number of instances in which the court reached different conclusions than 
the COFC or Boards of Contract Appeals.  While the Federal Circuit faces far fewer 
government contract cases than do the tribunals whose decisions it reviews, it does 
not hesitate to assert its independent judgment on questions of law in that realm, any 
more than in fields such as patent law, that comprise a greater part of its own docket.  
This should encourage practitioners who are unsuccessful in the first instance to 
consider appeal in cases not clearly governed by Federal Circuit precedent.”); Daniel 
P. Graham, et al., 2009 Government Contract Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. 
U. L. REV. 991, 995 (2010) (noting, among other things, that “the Federal Circuit 
continued to decide questions of contract interpretation according to its view of the 
‘plain meaning’ of the contract language at issue, in some cases concluding that this 
plain meaning had eluded the lower tribunal”); Lionel M. Lavenue, Survey of 
Government Contract Cases in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:  1997 
In Review, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1489 (1998) (“[G]overnment contract practitioners 
may wish to become ever more active and visible in this court of appeals bar, a bar 
that has traditionally focused primarily on patent law.  After all, due to the 
infrequency of Supreme Court review of government contract cases, the Federal 
Circuit represents the court of last resort for virtually all matters involving 
government contracts.”); David Robbins, 2004 Government Contract Decisions of the 
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unifying themes that define the court’s government contracts 
jurisprudence.  If anything, I find myself increasingly drawn to the 
perception that the court does not, and does not desire to, embrace 
the unique nature of the federal government contract regime as an 
analytical premise or predicate.  Rather, the court prefers what some 
have described as a more consistent, streamlined, simplified, or even 
formalistic approach to its highly varied docket. 
Where the Federal Circuit once resolved issues based upon “all the 
facts and circumstances,” it now more often applies a discrete list of 
factors.  Where the court once employed standards, it now employs 
rules.  Where the court once had dense rules, they have become 
leaner.  In short, the Federal Circuit has embraced an increasingly 
formal jurisprudence.3 
Of course, this convenient description is an over-simplification.  
But it seems entirely consistent with the reality that, at least in the 
government contracts sphere, the present court’s claim to 
specialization is tenuous at best. 
I. SPECIALIZATION:  SOME PERSPECTIVE 
A. Government Contracts Specialization:  An Empirical Snapshot 
As his retirement approached, Chief Judge Paul Michel repeatedly 
acknowledged the Federal Circuit’s lack of unique expertise in 
contracts and, specifically, government contract law. 
 Judge Michel urged the members of the Government contracts 
bar to consider seeking the nomination of persons with 
Government contracts expertise and experience as replacements 
for the Federal Circuit judges who would be retiring or taking 
senior status . . . . [T]he appointment of one or more individuals 
with such experience could go a long way towards raising the 
court’s understanding of the real-world effects of its decisions in 
the Government contracts area.4 
                                                 
Federal Circuit, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1205, 1238 (2005) (“While the Federal Circuit issued 
a number of decisions that could be termed ‘pro-contractor,’ when taken as a whole, 
the 2004 government contract decisions of the Federal Circuit likely will make life 
more difficult for contractors.  The lasting impact of the Federal Circuit’s ‘pro-
contractor’ indemnification and price increase decisions will be outweighed by other 
decisions restricting remedies available to contractors.”). 
 3. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773–74 
(2003). 
 4. Robert K. Huffman, Federal Circuit Decisions On Government Contracts:  Insights 
From The Roundtable, 24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 8, at 25, 28 (Feb. 2010); see also Paul R. 
Michel, Past, Present and Future in the Life of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1199, 1201 (2010) (“In my view, the wide variety of our pre-
appointment experiences is actually the greatest strength of our court.  Consider the 
varied backgrounds of the present eleven non-patent law judges:  one judge was a tax 
lawyer; two were Assistant Solicitors General; one a law school dean; another a civil 
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Of course, government contract law is not alone in this regard at 
the Federal Circuit.5  In discussing the court’s diversity in the context 
of then-pending vacancies at his final Judicial Conference, Judge 
Michel “note[d] that [the] court lacks anyone from West of the 
Allegheny Mountains, any Asian-American or African-American and 
anyone appointed who has specialized in contract, international 
trade, veterans or personnel law.”6  Granted, Judge Michel also 
pointed out—at the time—the absence of any “former district 
judges[;]” an absence which no longer persists.7 
Specialization can mean many things:  whether training in, or 
devoting oneself to, a specific area of study; pursuing a specific 
occupation; or concentrating on a unique field.  Of course, 
experience with or familiarity to the practice area prior to 
nomination and appointment is one factor.  But, as noted above, no 
current Federal Circuit judges claim pre-appointment experience in 
government contracts.  After appointment, however, a steady diet of 
cases should build a certain type of, at first, familiarity, and, over 
time, expertise.   
                                                 
appeals specialist; three . . . came to the court with varied experiences that included 
drafting legislation as Senate staffers; another had a civil practice in a distinguished 
law firm; and another litigated for the United States before becoming a special 
assistant to the then-Attorney General. . . .  [T]hree judges had clerked for Supreme 
Court Justices, and a fourth served as Special Assistant to the Chief Justice of the 
United States after graduating from West Point and seeing combat duty in Vietnam, 
experiencing private practice, and serving as Acting U.S. Special Counsel and a judge 
on the Claims Court.  So we are both patent specialists and nonspecialists . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  
 5. See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 
823 (2005) (“A related argument against the proposed national [patent] court was 
based on the historical antipathy to ‘specialized’ courts, for common law tradition 
favors a generalist approach to adjudication, at least in the appellate courts.  The 
concern is that specialists are likely to have a narrow viewpoint, and tend to favor 
vested interests and lose sight of the larger national interest.  Indeed, this concern 
directed the design of the Federal Circuit to have extremely diverse subject matter 
jurisdiction to reduce the risks of specialization.”)  It appears, at least in the 
government contracts, that any such risks remain low. 
 6. Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, State of the Court Address at the Judicial 
Conference for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 1–2 (May 
20, 2010), available at  
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/2010/stateofthecour
t10.pdf.  Potential relief awaits for at least one of these areas of law, with the 
nomination of Jimmie Reyna, an international trade specialist.  Alas, at the time of 
this writing, the nominations of Edward DuMont and Reyna remain pending.  
Neither, of course, boasts pre-nomination strength or unique familiarity with 
government contract law. 
 7. Judge Michel Offers Views on Federal Circuit Judicial Nominees, THE BLT:  THE 
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 19, 2009),  
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/03/judge-michel-offers-views-on-federal-
circuit-judicial-nominees.html.  Late last year, Judge Kathleen (Kate) O’Malley 
became the first judge on the court with previous experience as a district court 
judge.  For more than 15 years, Judge O’Malley served as a U.S. District Judge in the 
Northern District of Ohio. 
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The numbers do not demonstrate a steady diet.  Not surprisingly, 
in 2010, most Federal Circuit judges were not exposed to a large 
number of government contracts cases.8  Indeed, as Table 1, below, 
demonstrates, in 2010, no judge participated in ten, and the vast 
majority of judges participated in fewer than half a dozen, 
government contracts related matters.  Of course, judges participated 
in many more cases than they wrote.9  Judge Bryson, the most prolific 
writer on government contracts matters, participated in nine cases, 
and Judge Lourie participated in eight.  Four judges participated in 
five cases—Judges Newman, Prost, and Rader; two judges participated 
in four cases—Dyk and Moore.  Judges Clevenger, Linn, and Mayer 
each participated in three; Judge Gajarsa participated in two. 
Far more striking is that, in 2010, only one Federal Circuit judge, 
Judge Bryson, wrote more than two government contracts related 
decisions.  Judge Bryson issued five opinions.  Two judges—Judges 
Prost and Dyson—wrote two.  Judge Dyson, however, also wrote two 
concurring opinions; earning him the bragging rights as the second 
most prolific judge on these matters.  Five judges—Judges Gajarsa, 
Linn, Lourie, Mayer, and Rader—wrote one.  Judge Gajarsa, however, 
also drafted the only dissenting opinion in a government contracts 
related case in 2010.  Neither Judge Michel nor Judge Moore drafted 
a government contracts related opinion in 2010, nor did Senior 
Judges Archer, Clevenger, Friedman, Plager, or Schall.  In other 
words, Judge Mayer was the only senior judge (or judge entering a 
retirement year) to participate in a government contracts matter and 
also write an opinion. 
                                                 
 8. In the spirit of full disclosure, case selection methodology is neither entirely 
scientific nor uniformly consistent.  Accordingly, in the appendices to this Article, I 
list the cases I have included, and readers can decide whether I have been overly 
inclusive or exclusive.  For example, I chose not to include Bormes v. United States, 626 
F.3d 574 (Fed. Cir. 2010), a class action brought pursuant to the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a), that morphed into a complex 
jurisdictional challenge, and produced some extensive—but, for the purposes of this 
article, largely irrelevant—analysis of the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).  
Conversely, I included—but did not discuss separately in this Article—Arctic Slope 
Native Assoc. v. Sebelius, No. 2010-1013, 2010 WL 5129708 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 15, 2010), 
where the court affirmed the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA’s) grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the government in “the latest in a long-running 
dispute between the various Indian tribes and the Secretary concerning the 
Secretary’s obligation to pay contract support costs” under a contract to supply 
health services under the Indian Self-Determination Act.  Id. at 1 (citing Arctic Slope 
Native Assoc. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., CBCA 294-ISDA, 09-2 BCA ¶ 34,281 
(C.B.C.A. 2009)). 
 9. Two cases—Sullivan v. United States, 625 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam), and Ham Investments, LLC v. United States, 388 F. App’x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(per curiam)—were issued per curiam, and the judges received credit for 
participating but not writing the opinion. 
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Table 1:  Government Contracts Activity Per Federal Circuit Judge 2010 
Judge 
Participated 
in Decision 
Participated 
Without 
Writing 
Drafted 
Decision 
Concurring 
Decision 
Dissenting 
Decision 
Bryson 9 4 5   
Lourie 8 7 1   
Newman 5 5    
Prost 5 3 2   
Rader 5 4 1   
Dyk 4  2 2  
Moore 4 4    
Linn 3 2 1   
Gajarsa 2  1  1 
Michel10  1 1    
Senior Judges, etc. 
Clevenger 3 3    
Mayer 3 2 1   
Archer 1 1    
Friedman 1 1    
Plager 1 1    
Schall 1 1    
Kendall11 1 1    
 
As detailed in Appendices A and B, which identify the cases 
summarized in Tables 1 and 2, even this level of participation 
somewhat exaggerates the various judges’ exposure to government 
contracts matters.  For example, Nebraska Public Power District v. United 
States,12 decided en banc and discussed at length below, involved 
twelve judges.  In addition, Judge Rader received full credit for 
penning the unpublished, non-precedential opinion in Ham 
Investments, LLC v. United States.13  In what can fairly be described as 
an unremarkable case, the court found “no genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the Government waived the requirements of the 
Anti-Assignment Acts” and affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’ 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the government.14  My sense is 
                                                 
 10. Retired, May, 2010. 
 11. District Judge sitting by designation. 
 12. (NPPD II) 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 13. 388 F. App’x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 14. Id. at 961. 
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that little or no familiarity with federal government contracting was 
required for the court to resolve this matter.15  Indeed, the court 
explained that “HAM does not argue on appeal that the assignment 
met the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Acts.  Thus, this court 
need not address that issue[, and] the only issue on appeal is whether 
the Government waived the requirements of the Anti-Assignment 
Acts.”16 
Conversely, the process may not have been fully consistent in not 
including Sullivan v. United States,17 a short, per curiam decision.  
Sullivan was excluded from formal discussion because the Federal 
Circuit concluded that it was not a government contract case.  After a 
United States Postal Service contractor’s truck hit the Sullivans’ car, 
Mrs. Sullivan received $20,000, the maximum liability coverage under 
the contractor’s insurance policy.18  The Postal Service contract, 
however, required the contractor to carry at least $750,000 in liability 
insurance, but the contractor failed to do so.19  The Sullivans sued as 
third party beneficiaries to the Postal Service contract, asserting that, 
as motorists, they were intended to benefit from the contract’s 
insurance requirements.20  That seemed like a reasonable argument, 
and the trial court agreed.21  The Federal Circuit, however, was not 
persuaded.22  In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Federal 
Circuit explained:  “Regardless of whether the trial court properly 
classified the Sullivans as third party beneficiaries, the Sullivans still 
could not succeed in this breach of contract action against the 
                                                 
 15. None of this should suggest that anti-assignment issues are either 
unimportant or uninteresting.  See generally Heidi M. Schooner & Steven L. Schooner, 
Look Before You Lend:  A Lender’s Guide to Financing Government Contracts Pursuant to the 
Assignment of Claims Act, 48 BUS. LAWYER 535 (1993).  Here, in a lengthy decision, rich 
in factual detail and sprinkled liberally with deposition testimony, the lower court, 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, concluded that no valid assignment of payments 
had taken place.  Ham Invs., LLC v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 537, 553 (2009), aff’d 
388 F. App’x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  The trial court fleshed out two 
issues:  whether the assignee qualified under the statutory and regulatory definition 
of a “financing institution” and whether the government waived certain statutory 
requirements.  Id. at 548–52. “The Anti-Assignment Acts limit assignments of 
government contracts to third parties. . . . Statutory exceptions, however, may allow 
assignments, but only if certain requirements are fulfilled.” Id. at 547, (citing  
31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2006); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (renumbered as 41 U.S.C. § 6305 
pursuant to Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-350, 124 Stat. 3677, 3804 which 
recodified Title 41)). 
 16. Ham Investments, 388 F. App’x at 960. 
 17. 625 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 18. Id. at 1379. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1380–81. 
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Government.  [The contractor], in whose shoes the Sullivans must 
stand, breached the contract, not the Government.”23 
Granted, the sparse number of government contracts cases looks 
less stark when the more numerous cases from the prior year, 2009, 
are combined with 2010.  Indeed, the numbers more than double, to 
the extent that 2010 appears to have been a relatively light year.  Still, 
over a two-year period, some trends become slightly more 
pronounced.  Judge Bryson remains the most prolific judge on 
government contract matters.  Moreover, at least in my opinion, he 
drafted two or three of the more significant opinions in 2010.  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, Judge Moore, a patent scholar before 
joining the bench, appears to have been the only active judge not to 
draft a government contract opinion in either 2009 or 2010.  More 
significantly, all five senior judges and six active judges—Judges Linn, 
Lourie, Michel, Moore, Newman, and Rader—drafted two, one, or no 
opinions over a two-year period.  Judge Michel’s service as Chief 
Judge and his pending retirement make his inclusion less significant 
and any concern regarding his lack of participation substantively less 
noteworthy than that of Judge Moore. 
Table 2:  Government Contracts Activity Per  
Federal Circuit Judge 2009 and 2010 (combined) 
Judge 
Participated 
in Decision 
Participated 
Without 
Writing 
Drafted 
Decision 
Concurring 
Decision 
Dissenting 
Decision 
Bryson 16 7 9   
Lourie 15 13 1  1 
Newman 12 9 2  1 
Prost 10 5 5   
Rader 12 10 2   
Dyk 12 3 6 2 1 
Moore 6 6    
Linn 6 5 1   
Gajarsa 7 2 3  2 
Michel24  5 4 1   
Schall25 9 5 4   
                                                 
 23. Sullivan v. United States, 625 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  
For an extensive discussion of an ill-conceived legislative solution to such a potential 
contractor liability, see Schooner, infra note 187. 
 24. Retired, May, 2010. 
 25. Judge Schall took senior status in 2009. 
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Senior Judges 
Clevenger 4 3 1   
Mayer 10 8 2   
Archer 1 1    
Friedman 3 2 1   
Plager 4 2 2   
Judges Sitting By Designation 
Arterton26 1 1    
Huff27 1 1    
Kendall28 1 1    
Posner29 1 1    
Walker30 1  1   
Ward31  1 1    
 
In light of this empirical snapshot, it seems reasonable to ask 
whether this rather light volume of government contracts decisions 
permits judges to become specialists.32  The frequency with which 
judges have sat by designation on these matters might suggest that 
they are not daunted by the issues involved.  Indeed, particularly in 
                                                 
 26. District Judge sitting by designation. 
 27. District Judge sitting by designation. 
 28. District Judge sitting by designation. 
 29. Circuit Judge sitting by designation. 
 30. Chief District Judge sitting by designation. 
 31. District Judge sitting by designation. 
 32. It is not my intent here to rehash (but, instead, add an empirical element to) 
this debate.  That ground has been, and continues to be, consistently trodden.  
  The potential benefits of placing the adjudication of all contract claims 
against the government in one court and thus building a single consistent 
body of government contract law are well known. . . .  Generalist courts 
accustomed to normal contract disputes will not be able to strike an effective 
or consistent balance between treating the government as sovereign and 
treating it as a typical party to a contract, especially when they deal with such 
cases only sporadically. 
  Not all commentators agree, of course.  Some argue that an extra 
tribunal unnecessarily consumes resources, creates wasteful jurisdictional 
disputes, and leads to inefficient adjudication. 
Daniel Thies, Recent Development:  The Decline of the Court of Federal Claims in Nebraska 
Public Power District v. United States, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1203, 1214–15 (2010) (citing Steven L. Schooner, The Future:  Scrutinizing 
the Empirical Case for the Court of Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 751, 770–71 
(2003) (pointing out the number of contract suits that are adjudicated elsewhere in 
the federal system, thus minimizing the benefits of specialization, and arguing that 
the COFC’s docket could be distributed to the district courts at minimal additional 
cost)); see Joshua I. Schwartz, Public Contracts Specialization as a Rationale for the Court of 
Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 863, 863 (2003) (“[T]he semi-specialization of 
the [Court of Federal Claims] in litigation arising from government contracts lends it 
uniquely a genuine potential to contribute to the salutary development of the law in 
this field.”). 
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light of the non-mainstream government contracts cases included in 
this review—most dramatically, the non-procurement and, arguably, 
sui generis, Winstar cases and the Spent Nuclear Fuel cases—it seems 
that most Federal Circuit judges have very limited in-depth exposure 
to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),33 the uniform, 
government-wide regulation that applies to executive agency 
procurement contracts. 
As noted above, it appears that Judge Bryson has taken the lead in 
crafting the court’s opinions in government contracts.  Judge 
Bryson’s work appears careful and well reasoned, but it remains 
unclear whether Judge Bryson offers a unique philosophy on these 
cases, and only time will tell if he sustains his current pace.  More 
broadly, few Federal Circuit judges present an extensive, consistent 
body of work.  Probably the most significant exception would be 
Judge Pauline Newman.  Whether I agree with Judge Newman—or, 
whether, as a young Justice Department advocate,34 I expected a 
                                                 
 33. 48 C.F.R. Chapter 1 contains the government-wide regulation, and the 
following chapters represent agency-level supplements to the regulation. 
 34. It seems only appropriate, on this note, to mention that the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari for the purpose of reviewing to what extent the government’s 
invocation of the state secrets privilege may have impacted the outcome of this long-
running litigation.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 567 F.3d 1340 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. Boeing Co. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010).  
Oral argument took place on January 18, 2011.  The Federal Circuit described this 
litigation as the American version of Jarndyce and Jarndyce, id. at 1342, the fictional 
court case in the Charles Dickens novel Bleak House.  CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 
20 (Signet Classic 1980) (1853) (“This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, 
become so complicated that no man alive knows what it means.”).  This stage of 
appellate review guarantees that this long running dispute will survive into its 
twentieth year.  In June of 1991, when the contractors filed their lawsuit in the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims, I was a trial attorney at the Department of Justice.  Now, 
“final resolution . . . may well turn on the complicated and little explored interplay 
between the Government’s right to protect highly sensitive information [in] dispute 
resolution on contracts involving that information.”  Neil H. O’Donnell & Dennis J. 
Callahan, Feature Comment:  The A-12 Saga Continues, 52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 388, 
Dec. 8, 2010, at 1–3; see also Nash, January 2011, 25 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 1, at 1 (Jan. 
2011) [hereinafter Nash, January].  My predecessor on this faculty, Ralph Nash, 
criticized the reasoning of the Federal Circuit’s 2003 decision for reasons I revisit, in 
a similar context, in this article’s discussion of Maropakis, infra Part II.B.  The Federal 
Circuit reasoned 
that the nondisclosure of vital information defense was not a normal 
defense because the contractors were plaintiffs presenting a contractor 
claim . . . .   . . [U]nder the Contract Disputes Act, contractors are always 
the plaintiffs even though they are litigating Government claims.  Up until 
the Federal Circuit decision, almost everyone had understood that this was 
merely a procedural matter but that the Government was the actual party 
asserting the claim when litigating the validity of a default termination.  
(The burden of proof has always been on the Government to uphold the 
validity of the default termination.) . . . [M]aking contractors plaintiffs in 
all cases [may be] a “convenient fiction.”  But the Federal Circuit’s analysis 
makes it rather inconvenient for the contractors (at a cost of 
approximately $3 billion). 
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daunting challenge persuading her—I respect her consistency and 
vision.  As an academic, I admit a fondness for overarching principles 
and theories that help explain regimes or resolve difficult problems.35  
Accordingly, I find myself increasingly drawn to her opinions, 
perspective, and jurisprudence. 
B. Judge Newman:  A Unique Niche? 
Long well-respected in the patent bar, Judge Newman also has 
established a unique place in government contracts.  Stanfield 
Johnson’s recent article chronicles her highly individualistic quest 
and heralds her as the court’s “great dissenter.”36  Johnson makes a 
compelling case that over a twenty-year period, particularly through 
her numerous dissenting opinions, Judge Newman has articulated a 
unique judicial approach to government contracts cases.  More 
importantly, she effectively has distinguished herself from her judicial 
colleagues.  Judge Newman’s “dissents respectfully but emphatically 
criticize her colleagues for not recognizing legitimate interests of 
contractors . . . seeking remedies from the Government . . . [and] 
consistently reflect the view that a primary responsibility of the court 
is to serve ‘the national policy of fairness to contractors.’”37 
Johnson accurately describes Judge Newman’s judicial approach 
towards government contracts over the years as “persistent—and 
                                                 
Nash, January, supra ¶ 1, at 1. It is hard not to be at least somewhat cynical about an 
acquisition regime and a judicial system that permits this story to continue unfolding 
today.  See also Natanya DeWeese & James Rumpf, General Dynamics Corp. v. United 
States 
(09-1298); Boeing Company v. United States (09-1302), LIIBULLETIN, 
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/09-1298 (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). 
 35. See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata:  Objectives for a System of Government 
Contract Law, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV 103, 110 (2002) (“Ultimately, each 
government must decide how much discretion or flexibility it wishes to delegate to its 
buyers. . . . No system can achieve all of [the discussed] goals.  Nor can a state expect 
that its objectives for its system will remain constant over time.  Determining which 
goals are most important is a daunting, ever-evolving challenge.”); Christopher R. 
Yukins, A Versatile Prism:  Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model, 
40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 63, 63–64 (2010) (“Long established in economics and the other 
social sciences, the principal-agent model . . . provides a model to explain successes 
(and failures) in organizational structures, and also to understand the procurement 
system and its rules.”); see also RALPH C. NASH, JR. ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 
REFERENCE BOOK:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROCUREMENT  
(3d ed. 2007) (organizing the variety of government contract terms and definitions 
alphabetically). 
 36. W. Stanfield Johnson, The Federal Circuit’s Great Dissenter and Her “National 
Policy of Fairness to Contractors”, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 275 (2011). 
 37. Id. at 276 (manuscript at 3) (citing England v. Contel Advanced Sys., Inc., 
384 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting)). 
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largely lonely[.]”38  I sense that he is correct to employ the word 
“advocacy” in describing her jurisprudence.39  Johnson explains that: 
At the core of Judge Newman’s dissenting jurisprudence is the 
premise that the sovereign as a contracting party should be 
accountable for its actions, subject only to limited exceptions not to 
be presumed, unnecessarily expanded, or imposed in a formalistic, 
doctrinaire way that ignores or masks the facts of government 
conduct.  Where the facts justify it, contractors should be entitled 
to a “fair and just” remedy, and the Federal Circuit is there to make 
sure this happens.40 
Indeed, Johnson properly identifies Newman’s unique place on the 
court’s spectrum in the context of the never ending balance that 
must be struck in government contracts cases:  “How [should judges] 
harmonize the court’s general duty to hold the Government 
accountable under the law of contracts with its duty to protect the 
sovereign and its funds?  Which judicial duty has priority?”41  Some of 
Johnson’s most compelling analysis derives from his frustration 
that—despite years of her “advocacy”—Judge Newman appears to 
have gained little ground in moving the court along the spectrum 
toward a hypothetical center.  Despite the historical grounding of her 
jurisprudence, Judge Newman apparently has failed to convert her 
colleagues. 
Her jurisprudence is so consistent with the authorized history of 
the jurisdiction inherited from the Court of Claims, declaring the 
court as a nation’s “conscience,” that one wonders why she appears 
a maverick among the judges of the Federal Circuit.  And why is 
she so frequently alone in objecting to obstacles to justice raised by 
her colleagues, frustrating the court’s historic “unique and 
permanent contribution” of making “Government officials 
accountable?42 
As discussed at length below, Judge Newman proved true to form 
in 2010, dissenting in M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States,43 
expressing disapproval, if not exasperation, with the majority’s 
unwillingness to protect the interest of a government contractor.44 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 333. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 338. 
 41. Id. at 339.  “In some respects the differences between Judge Newman and her 
colleagues involve this sorting out process—with Judge Newman on what might be 
called the liberal equitable side, and the majorities on the conservative, stricter side 
of the divide.”  Id.  
 42. Id. at 333 (citing 2 WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
CLAIMS:  A HISTORY 170 (1978)). 
 43. 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 44. Id. at 1332, 1334–35 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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C. A Level Playing Field? 
What is particularly striking about this long running debate is that, 
in the end, it returns to the amount of deference that the 
government enjoys in federal court and, more specifically, in a highly 
specialized appellate court, in Washington, D.C., with a heavy diet of 
cases in which the government is one of the parties.  Johnson 
correctly “suspect[s] the reader will . . . find that his or her own 
judgments will turn on fundamental views about what the 
relationship between the sovereign and its contractors should be—
and what the role of the Federal Circuit in overseeing that 
relationship should be.”45  In other words, most readers will not 
hesitate, when confronted with a government contracts case, to opine 
whether the Federal Circuit should attempt to manage a level playing 
field, or whether the government—for whatever reason—should 
expect to enjoy a leg up.  Consistent with a career in private practice, 
Johnson voices the perspective that:  “One would think that . . . the 
Federal Circuit would provide a level playing field between the 
sovereign and its contractors [a]nd, further, that the court would 
without hesitation seek to serve its historic mission of holding the 
Government accountable as the law would hold private individuals.”46  
For those unfamiliar with this aspect of the court’s jurisprudence, 
Johnson persuasively disabuses the notion of the level playing field.  
Rather, as a general rule, the government, as defendant and litigant, 
enjoys both deference and access to a broad arsenal of defenses.  
Looking back, the congressionally created Acquisition Advisory 
Panel’s 2007 report47 attempted to air this issue.  The panel began 
from the premise that the: 
fundamental difference between government and commercial 
contracting is unequal treatment of the parties in the contracting 
process.  The government enjoys certain contractual “advantages” 
by virtue of its status as the “sovereign” resulting in benefits from 
the centuries-old, judicially created doctrine of sovereign or 
governmental immunity.   The prime example of this doctrine is 
that the government cannot be sued unless (and only to the extent 
that) it consents to be sued . . . .48 
Conversely, “[t]he United States Supreme Court . . . has held for 
some 130 years that the same rules of contract interpretation and 
                                                 
 45. Johnson, supra note 36 at 333. 
 46. Id. at 343. 
 47. REPORT OF THE ACQUISITION ADVISORY PANEL TO THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL 
PROCUREMENT POLICY AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (Jan. 2007), available at 
https://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/finalaapreport.html.  
 48. Id. at 84 (emphasis removed). 
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performance apply to both the government and contractors.”49  The 
Acquisition Advisory Panel, however, described a phenomenon in 
which the courts and board of contract appeals have ignored the 
Supreme Court’s guidance and provided favorable treatment to the 
government rather than contractors without a statutory, 
Constitutional, or contractual basis.  “These areas included the 
presumption of regularity (that actions of the government were 
conducted properly and correctly), estoppel against the government, 
the presumption of good faith, and interest as damages.”50 
Ultimately, the panel found that providing unequal treatment in 
government contracts is “inconsistent with commercial practices[.]”  
The government and its contractors should enjoy equal treatment 
“unless the Constitution of the United States or special 
considerations of the public interest require otherwise.”51  All of 
which leads, in Johnson’s opinion, to “the bottom-line effect that the 
Government avoids accountability and the public fisc is protected.”52  
From this, Johnson concludes: 
[T]he Federal Circuit has made protection of the public fisc its 
priority.  Plainly, . . . it is no longer considered a priority or “special 
responsibility” of the court “to make government officials 
accountable to the citizens whose servants they are” or for the 
Government “to render prompt justice against itself.” And thus, sad 
to say, the court no longer defines “its mission” as “hold[ing] and 
speak[ing] a nation’s conscience.”53 
D. The Federal Circuit’s Role? 
Johnson was not alone in voicing this theme in 2010.  My 
predecessor and colleague, Emeritus Professor Ralph C. Nash, Jr., 
articulated that, historically, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor, the 
                                                 
 49. Id. at 85. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 98.  The panel also noted the concluding language in the American Bar 
Association’s Section of Public Contract Law’s comments: 
The contractor and the Government shall enjoy the same legal 
presumptions, if any, in discharging their duties and in exercising their 
rights in connection with the performance of any Government contract, and 
either party’s attempt to rebut any legal presumption that applies to the 
other party’s conduct shall be subject to a uniform evidentiary standard that 
applies equally to both parties.  
Id. at 86 (quoting Letter from A.B.A. Section of Pub. Contract Law to  
Laura Auletta, Exec. Dir., Gen. Servs. Admin. (June 22, 2006), available at 
https://www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/documents/sectionofpubliccontractlawaba-
22june06.pdf. 
 52. Johnson, supra note 36 at 343. 
 53. Id. at 346 (citing 2 WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
CLAIMS:  A HISTORY (1978) at 170–71). 
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Court of Claims, “perceived itself as the conscience of the nation.”54  
Indeed, that court’s output and generally accepted philosophy 
indicated that “[n]othing could be more important than ensuring 
that the citizens of this country believe that their federal government 
treats them fairly.”55  Today, Nash joins Johnson in concluding that 
the “Federal Circuit seems to have slowly drifted away from this view 
of its role.”56 
Nash offers “three possible factors moving the Federal Circuit in 
the direction it has taken.”57  First, he postulates that the court prefers 
strict, rather than flexible, rules for the government’s public 
procurement regime.  “There seems to be a belief that there are no 
shades of gray in contracting—that the issues are either black or 
white.”58  Nash also senses that the Federal Circuit’s judges 
increasingly appear to mistrust trial judges, whether at the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims or at the agency boards of contract appeals.59 
The fashioning of strict legal rules appears to be taking discretion 
away from the judges on the Court of Federal Claims and the 
boards of contract appeals to assess the facts fully and seek a fair 
outcome.  This trend can be seen in [many] areas . . . particularly 
in the accounting area demanding use of the Eichleay formula to 
the exclusion of accounting evidence, thereby depriving judges of 
the advice of experts in complex accounting matters.  The reversals 
of carefully analyzed board decisions in Winter and Rumsfeld are 
striking in this regard.  Yet the board judges are the most 
experienced judges in their field in the federal arena—with a 
requirement of five years of experience before appointment and 
having served, in most cases, for many years hearing only 
government contract disputes.  Similarly, the judges on the Court 
of Federal Claims are highly competent—albeit with less 
government contracts experience.  Historically, all of these judges 
have demonstrated the ability to sift through complex facts and 
apply the law to arrive at a fair result.  The Federal Circuit’s efforts 
to restrict this endeavor seem misplaced.60 
                                                 
 54. Ralph C. Nash, Jr., The Government Contracts Decisions of the Federal Circuit,  
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 586, 587 (2010) [hereinafter Nash, Government Contracts]. 
 55. Id. at 587–88. 
 56. Id. at 588. 
 57. Id. at 612. 
 58. Id. at 612.  Nash criticizes this perception, pointing out that all contract 
disputes, particularly with interpretation and authority disputes, turn on case specific 
facts and the legal rules to be applied to those facts.  “The dogmatic application of a 
strict legal rule in these situations—without a close analysis of the factual nuances—
can lead to unfair results.”  Id. at 612–13. 
 59. Id. at 613. 
 60. Id. 
1082 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1067 
Nash’s third theory for explaining the trend is that the court would 
like to “impose more rigorous standards on the people in the 
government and industry that draft and perform government 
contracts.”61  Nash suggests, and few would disagree, “that 
government contracting would be more effective if all of the 
participants in the process were more careful in the language that 
they use and the techniques they adopt to achieve satisfactory 
performance.”62  Like Nash, however, I am not sanguine that 
attempting to impose such an outcome, by force of will, will bear fruit 
either for the court or the taxpayers.63  Ultimately, as a result, Nash 
concludes that the government, the private sector, and the public are 
worse off.  “It appears that the court does not seek to show the 
citizenry that the government deals fairly with it.”64  While that 
assessment may seem harsh, the weight of precedent indicates that it 
is increasingly accurate. 
E. Another Way Forward? 
There may be another way forward—not necessarily that the 
Federal Circuit should be more solicitous of contractors and 
claimants, but rather that the court’s judges should more fully 
recognize, and engage in, their roles in shaping the evolving 
government procurement legal regime.  That was certainly the Court 
of Claims’ role, in its heyday, before the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation helped codify and harmonize federal procurement law in 
1984.65  The old Court of Claims, which was folded into the Federal 
                                                 
 61. Id. at 614. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  First,  
[g]overnment contracting is done by business-trained people, generally 
without legal training, who are pressed for time to get their immediate task 
accomplished.  Thus, most contracts are signed without careful legal review, 
and the major contracts are so complex that even legal review is not likely to 
catch all of the glitches in the document.  These same contracts are 
frequently performed under stressful conditions where the main focus is to 
get the job done.  The people on both sides of the transaction generally try 
to follow the precise rules applicable to government procurement, but there 
are inevitable failures in this regard. 
Id.  Second, it is unrealistic, for the foreseeable future, to expect a significant 
upgrade in the performance of the government’s acquisition workforce, which has 
been stretched past the breaking point.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S. 
Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible 
Governance, 6 J. CONT. MGMT. 9 (Summer 2008) (arguing that there is no short-term 
solution to the lack of resources available to the Department of Homeland Security 
and other agencies). 
 64. Nash, Government Contracts, supra note 54, at 614. 
 65. The FAR took effect on April 1, 1984.  The rule-makers’ description of the 
new, consolidated regulation sheds light on its purpose and, more broadly, hints at 
why some authority may have shifted from the courts to the rule-makers:  the 
transaction costs of running and enhancing complex procurement systems drop 
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Circuit, served a central role in defining and refining federal 
procurement law.66  In many ways, the Federal Circuit today has 
departed from that role.   
The other two branches of government, in contrast, are intensely 
engaged in shaping the procurement law regime; in practice, 
Congress and the Executive Branch often compete for primacy.  The 
most recent defense authorization act, for example, included 
provisions on business systems regulation67 and intellectual property68 
                                                 
dramatically if direction for that system can come from a centralized rulemaking 
process, rather than from the courts.  The introductory statement for the FAR stated, 
in late 1983: 
The [FAR] establishes (a) a single regulation for use by all Executive 
agencies in their acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated 
funds, and (b) the [FAR] System consisting of the FAR and agency 
acquisition regulations that implement or supplement the FAR.  The FAR is 
prepared, issued, and maintained, and the [FAR] System is prescribed, 
jointly by the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of General Services, 
and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
under their several statutory authorities.  The FAR, together with agency 
supplemental regulations, replaces the current Federal Procurement 
Regulations System, the Defense Acquisition Regulation, and the NASA 
Procurement Regulation. . . .  The major intended effects of the FAR are to 
(a) produce a clear, understandable document that maximizes feasible 
uniformity in the acquisition process, (b) reduce the proliferation of agency 
acquisition regulations, (c) implement recommendations made by the 
Commission on Government Procurement, the Federal Paperwork 
Commission, various Congressional groups, and others, and (d) facilitate 
agency, industry, and public participation in the development and 
maintenance of the FAR and agency acquisition regulations. 
Establishing the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 42102, 42102 (Sept. 19, 
1983) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. Ch. 1) (emphasis added). 
 66. Paul D. Carrington & Paulina Orchard, The Federal Circuit:  A Model For 
Reform?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575, 577 (2010) (noting that the Court of Claims 
folded into the Federal Circuit); see Richard Linn, The Future Role of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Now That It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 
732 (2004) (noting that the Federal Circuit accepted as binding precedent the law of 
the Court of Claims); Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 821, 823–24 (2005) (explaining the origins of the Federal Circuit);  Daniel J. 
Meador, Retrospective on the Federal Circuit:  The First 20 Years—A Historical View, 11 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 557, 558 (2001-2002) (explaining the formation of the Federal Circuit); 
Pauline Newman, Origins of the Federal Circuit:  The Role of Industry, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 
541, 541 (2001-2002) (describing the origins of the Federal Circuit).  See generally 2 
WILSON COWEN, ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS:  A HISTORY (1978) 
(summarizing Court of Claims’ procurement caselaw). 
 67. Compare Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  
2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 893, 124 Stat. 4137 (2011) [hereinafter Ike Skelton 
National Defense Authorization Act] (directing the Secretary of Defense to initiate a 
program for the improvement of contractor business systems with Congressional 
guidelines), with Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Business 
Systems—Definition and Administration, 75 Fed. Reg. 75550 (Dec. 3, 2010) (to be 
codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 215, 234, 242, 244, 245, and 252) (proposing an 
amendment of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to 
improve the Department of Defense’s oversight of contract business systems) 
(proposed rule).  See generally Christopher R. Yukins & Kristen E. Ittig, Feature 
Comment:  The Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011—A Bounded Step Forward for 
Acquisition Reform, 53 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 8, Jan. 12, 2011, at 7 (describing the 
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that in many ways overlapped pending regulatory reforms.  This 
vibrant exchange between Congress and the regulators means, in 
practice, that the U.S. procurement regime hurtles more rapidly 
down an evolutionary path of improvement.  Because other systems 
proceed on parallel paths,69 it seems reasonable to assume that if the 
Federal Circuit engaged more actively and knowledgeably, the U.S. 
system would move ever more rapidly towards progress. 
Besides the Court of Claims’ historical model, there are 
contemporary examples for a fully engaged circuit—a full partner in 
the legislative and regulatory efforts to develop the law.  The Second 
Circuit is well known for its contributions to securities law, and the 
D.C. Circuit plays an enormous role in shaping administrative and 
antitrust law.  In short, there is no reason for the Federal Circuit not 
to engage more fully, and serve as the third co-equal branch in 
shaping procurement law in the federal government. 
II. THE 2010 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS CASES 
 This journey now turns to what the introduction previously 
described as a rather small hodge-podge of, frankly, unrelated 
government contracts cases resolved by the Federal Circuit in 2010.  
The article first discusses three award controversy or bid protests 
matters.  Then, it examines a handful of post-award performance or 
contract administration disputes.  The article then directs attention 
to a few selections from the ongoing behemoths of litigation in the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims—the sui generic Winstar and Spent 
Nuclear Fuel debacles.  Finally, the piece concludes—I think 
fittingly—with a potentially analogous implied warranty case. 
                                                 
conflict between legislative and rulemaking efforts to improve contractor business 
systems). 
 68. Compare Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act § 801, with Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Patents, Data, and Copyrights, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 59412 (Sept. 27, 2010) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 212, 227, 246, and 252) 
(proposing amendments to the DFARS rule on technical data rights). 
 69. See Steen Treumer, The Discretionary Powers of Contracting Entities—Towards a 
Flexible Approach in the Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice?,  
15 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2006) (discussing the growing role that the 
European Court of Justice is playing in shaping European member states’ 
procurement law).  My colleagues and I continue to see great value in looking 
abroad.  See Christopher R. Yukins & Steven L. Schooner, Incrementalism:  Eroding the 
Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 529, 565 (2007) 
(describing among other things, “rationalization, the process of ensuring that the 
instruments being relied upon by individual states to open markets do, in fact, 
produce a legislative and regulatory template for procurement procedures which are 
fundamentally sound (e.g., reflect best practices) and which produce efficient, value-
based results”). 
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A. Disappointed Offeror Litigation or Bid Protests 
In Resource Conservation Group v. United States,70 problems arose out 
of the attempt to lease the former Naval Academy dairy farm 
property.  Resource Conservation Group proposed to lease the 
property so that it could mine it for sand and gravel.71  The 
contracting officer determined that mining would entail the disposal 
of real property and, therefore, deemed Resource Conservation’s 
proposal outside the scope of the solicitation.72  Resource 
Conservation sued, in the United States Court of Federal Claims, but 
did not challenge the actual award of the contract.  Rather, it merely 
sought to recover the $500,000 it expended in bid preparation costs 
and fees.73  Resource Conservation asserted that the government’s 
failure to timely warn prospective offerors of its interpretation 
foreclosed Resource Conservation’s offer.74  Among other things, 
Resource Conservation alleged that the Navy breached the implied 
contract of fair and honest consideration.75 
The court “express[ed] no opinion on whether the government 
was obligated to inform potential bidders of the perceived limitations 
imposed by 10 U.S.C. § 6976[,]”76 so the only real significance of the 
case lies in what seems to be the never ending saga of federal court 
disappointed offeror jurisdiction.77  The court revisited the scope of 
the Court of Federal Claims’ bid protest jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1491.  Because the matter involved the lease of government 
property, rather than a government purchase, the court concluded 
that “the Court of Federal Claims was correct in holding that relief 
under 1491(b)(1) is unavailable outside the procurement context.”78  
But the case is far more interesting to the extent that the court 
determined that the COFC could assert implied-in-fact jurisdiction 
over nonprocurement solicitations.  The court concluded that “the 
implied-in-fact contract jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) 
                                                 
 70. 597 F.3d 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 71. Id. at 1240. 
 72. Id. at 1241. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1240–41. 
 76. Res. Conservation Grp. v. United States, 597 F.3d 1238, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 77. Prior to the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, federal district courts 
exercised jurisdiction—separate and apart from the Tucker Act—under the 
Administrative Procedure Act to review challenges to the award of federal 
government contract.  See, e.g., Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970) (holding that the Administrative Procedure Act entitled aggrieved bidders 
judicial review). 
 78. Res. Conservation Grp., 597 F.3d at 1245. 
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that existed prior to 1996 survived the enactment of the ADRA, . . . 
where the new statute does not provide a remedy.”79 
Specifically, the court rejected the government’s argument that 
“continuation of the implied-in-fact jurisdiction would be inconsistent 
with the purposes of the ADRA, which clearly was designed to place 
all bid protest challenges in a single court (after a sunset period) 
under a single standard (the APA standard).”80  The court went so far 
as to intuit that, based upon its analysis, “a disappointed bidder in a 
nonprocurement case could also theoretically bring its bid protest 
challenge in a federal district court, since the ADRA only repealed 
jurisdiction over procurement cases.”81  The court conceded that 
“[D]ividing jurisdiction between the Court of Federal Claims and the 
district courts for non-procurement bid protests may lead to similar 
problems that led to the enactment of 1491(b)(1).  However, if the 
statute [must] be amended, that amendment must be undertaken by 
Congress and not this court.”82 
One surprising feature of this decision is how the court considers 
“the meaning of the phrase ‘in connection with a procurement or a 
proposed procurement.’”83  The court explains that “[i]n construing 
statutory language, we look to dictionary definitions published at the 
time that the statute was enacted.”84  That seems fine, but the reader 
is not alone in thinking that a better place to start may have been 
with Title 41 of the United States Code,85 which the court 
                                                 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1246. 
 81. Id. at 1246 n.12. 
 82. Id. at 1246.  I hope that the worst case scenario does not play out.  
Experience suggests that clear jurisdictional lines produce far more efficient 
outcomes.  See, e.g., Christopher M. Chaisson, et al., The Sunset of Scanwell Jurisdiction 
and the Award of Attorney’s Fees to Disappointed Offerors, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 65, 86–87 
(2000) (urging that district courts maintain jurisdiction over bid protest cases); 
Michael F. Mason, Bid Protests and the U.S. District Courts—Why Congress Should Not 
Allow the Sun to Set on this Effective Relationship, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 567, 597 (1997) 
(concluding that the district courts have served as an adequate court to remedy 
government violations of procurement laws); Steven L. Schooner, Feature Comment:  
Watching The Sunset:  Anticipating GAO’s Study Of Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction In 
The COFC And The District Courts, 42 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 108, Mar. 22, 2000, at 3–4  
(asserting that GAO should have concluded that the elimination of District Court 
jurisdiction would hinder the opportunity of small businesses to challenge violations 
of federal procurement law); Peter Verchinski, Are District Courts Still a Viable Forum for 
Bid Protests?, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 404 (2003) (arguing that district courts provide 
an adequate alternative forum for small business in bid protest cases). 
 83. Res. Conservation Grp., 597 F.3d at 1243. 
 84. Id. at 1243–44 (discussing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1208 (6th ed. 1990), and 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1809 (1993)). 
 85. See Office of Procurement Policy Act, 41 U.S.C. § 403 (2006) (renumbered as  
41 U.S.C. § 111 pursuant to Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-350, 124 Stat. 3677, 
3681 which recodified Title 41) (defining the term “procurement” as used in public 
contracts). 
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subsequently addresses.  As Ralph Nash noted, commenting on the 
Federal Circuit’s reliance on dictionary definitions: 
This is backwards.  Dictionary definitions of terms of art in the 
world of Government contracting are a highly unlikely source of 
meaning, much less plain meaning.  Yet the court is wedded to 
dictionaries . . . [B]oth Mr. Webster and Mr. Black are long gone 
and neither they nor their successors have had the vaguest notion 
of how words are used when the Federal Government buys goods 
and services.86 
That seems eminently reasonable.  Context matters. 
While I am hesitant to call any government contracts case 
uninteresting, some are; yet I do appreciate periodically seeing the 
court describe the government’s actions as rational.  In Savantage 
Financial Services, Inc. v. United States,87 the court affirmed the COFC’s 
denial of a garden variety pre-award protest.  The protest arose when 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “required proposers to 
offer a system that is integrated and currently fully operational within 
the federal government.”88  Obviously, such a requirement restricts 
competition, which, in a vacuum, is inappropriate.89 
The court found the restriction reasonable.90  Among other things:  
“On a question such as whether to implement a pre-integrated system 
or to build a system by beginning with a core financial system and 
then integrating other systems afterwards, an agency’s preferences 
are entitled to great weight.”91  Further, to the extent that DHS had 
struggled to create such a system from the ground up, the “DHS 
could reasonably prefer a system that is already operating 
successfully.”92 
In Pai Corp. v. United States,93 the court, affirming the COFC, chose 
not to overturn a contract award based upon an alleged 
organizational conflict of interest (OCI).94  “The trial court found 
                                                 
 86. Ralph C. Nash, Postscript:  The Implied Contract to Fairly and Honestly Consider an 
Offer, 24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 27, at 85 (June 2010). 
 87. 595 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 88. Id. at 1284. 
 89. See 48 C.F.R. § 6.101(a) (2008) (“[C]ontracting officers shall promote and 
provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government 
contracts.”). 
 90. Savantage Fin. Servs., Inc., 595 F.3d at 1288.  The appellate court also, as a 
matter of fact, found “no support for [the] argument that DHS’s requirements 
constitute a pretextual attempt to circumvent the trial court’s earlier injunction and 
procure an Oracle-based system.”  Id. 
 91. Id. at 1286. 
 92. Id. at 1287. 
 93. 614 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 94. 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2008) (“Organizational conflict of interest means that because 
of other activities or relationships with other persons, a person is unable or 
potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to the Government, or the 
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that the integrity of the procurement was not compromised[,]”95 and 
the appellate court agreed.  The court showed sufficient deference, 
explaining that it would “not overturn a contracting officer’s 
determination unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary 
to law.”96  But even that deference was unnecessary, to the extent that 
the court concluded that “the contracting officer fully complied with 
the FAR requirements . . . [,] timely identified and evaluated any 
potential conflicts . . . [,] pursued a number of steps to resolve any 
potential conflicts, . . . [and] also completed an additional and 
comprehensive conflicts investigation[.]”97   
I do not mean to suggest this particular case also was uninteresting, 
but I sense that, this year, most practitioners will be far more 
interested in the potentially dramatic ongoing regulatory 
developments involving OCI’s.  Late in the year, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) issued a final rule on organizational conflicts of 
interest in major defense acquisition programs, pursuant to the 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA).98  The 
parallel efforts of the FAR Council and DoD and how they eventually 
are reconciled should be interesting to watch.99  Moreover, the 
                                                 
person’s objectivity in performing the contract work is or might be otherwise 
impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage.”); see also 48 C.F.R. pt. 9.5 
(addressing organizational conflicts of interest); Daniel I. Gordon, Organizational 
Conflicts of Interest:  A Growing Integrity Challenge, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 25, 25–26 (2005) 
(broadly discussing organizational conflicts of interest in the global context). 
 95. Pai Corp., 614 F.3d at 1349. 
[T]he [CO] determined that, although [competitors] had access to non-
public information through their existing contracts, such information had 
no competitive value in the present procurement.  The [CO] also found 
that, with respect to ITP, the information to which it had access involved 
constantly changing requirements, was quickly outdated, and was therefore 
of little value. 
Id. at 1350. 
 96. Id. at 1352. 
 97. Id. at 1353. 
 98. See Final Rule, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; 
Organizational Conflicts of Interest in Major Defense Acquisition Programs,  
75 Fed. Reg. 81908 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 209 and 252) 
(explaining that the law  “allows DoD to establish such limited exceptions as are 
necessary to ensure that DoD has continued access to advice on systems architecture 
and systems engineering matters from highly qualified contractors, while also 
ensuring that such advice comes from sources that are objective and unbiased.”);  
see also Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Public Law No. 111-23 § 
207, 123 Stat. 1704, 1728–30 (2009) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 101) (outlining 
organizational conflicts of interest in major defense acquisition programs). 
 99. While the proposed Defense Department rule would have applied sweeping 
new OCI rules government-wide, and would have recast OCI issues as matters of 
contractor integrity (in the Defense Department supplement to FAR Part 3) rather 
than contractor qualification (FAR Part 9)—a relatively radical change—the final 
rule took a more conservative approach, and confined the new rule to major Defense 
Department acquisitions and Part 3 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement.  The prefatory language to the final DFARS rule clarifies that “because 
the FAR proposed rule has not yet been published, and because the decision has 
2011] 2010 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS 1089 
promulgation of the new rules likely will not come soon enough to 
stem the “flurry of Government Accountability Office protests this 
year on organizational conflicts of interest.”100 
B. Post-Award Contract Administration and Contract Performance 
Turning to the world of post-award government contract 
management and disputes, many observers found Precision Pine & 
Timber v. United States101 to be problematic.  The Forest Services’ 
timber contracts are unique, and the 1993 listing of the Mexican 
spotted owl as an endangered species threw quite a wrench into the 
works.102  Among other things, significant contractual delays resulted.  
The procedural history of the case is complex due, in part, to (1) the 
distinction between the individual timber contracts and the Forest 
Service’s land management documents (or Land Resource 
Management Plans (LRMPs)) and (2) proceedings in the U.S. 
District Court of Arizona and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.103  
Briefly, however, the court faced two issues:  “whether clause CT 6.25 
of the timber contracts create[d] an express warranty; [and] whether 
the government breached the implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.”104  The Federal Circuit read the contractual language, 
determined its plain meaning, and came to a conclusion different 
from the trial court.105  The court concluded that “CT 6.25 did not 
create an express warranty and the Forest Service did not breach its 
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.”106  Other commentators 
have attempted to explain the difference in approach between the 
trial and appellate court: 
                                                 
been made to limit this rule to implementation of OCIs in [major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAPs)] . . . this final rule has been located primarily in 
[DFARS] subpart 209.5, until such time as the FAR coverage on OCIs may be 
relocated.”  Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Organizational 
Conflicts of Interest in Major Defense Acquisition Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 81908, 
81910 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 209 and 252).  
 100. Ralph C. Nash, Postscript IV:  Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 24 NASH & 
CIBINIC REP. ¶ 25, at 76 (May 2010) (“[S]ince the FAR is obsolete, the rules of the 
game have to be learned from the litigated cases.”). 
 101. 596 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 102. Id. at 819–20.  Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Forest Service 
was required to consult with U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) to ensure that no 
action would “jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species . . . or 
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.”   
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
 103. See Precision Pine, 596 F.3d at 821–24 (discussing, inter alia, Pac. Rivers 
Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) and Silver v. Babbitt, 924 F. Supp. 
976 (D. Ariz. 1995)). 
 104. Id. at 824. 
 105. Id. at 826. 
 106. Id. at 834.  Among other things, Precision Pine was not entitled to a 
“guarantee of uninterrupted performance.”  Id. at 831. 
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 The COFC construed [the relevant contract clause,] CT 6.25 as 
creating an express warranty that the Forest Service had analyzed 
reasonably available information and identified special measures 
that it knew or should have known about that were necessary to 
comply with the [Endangered Species Act or] ESA.  The COFC 
held that the Forest Service breached this warranty by failing to 
consult formally on the forest management plans after the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Pac. Rivers.  Because the Forest Service did not 
follow ESA procedures, the COFC said the Forest Service had no 
reasonable basis to know whether the measures identified in the 
contract were adequate. 
 The Federal Circuit rejected this interpretation of CT 6.25 
because the plain language of the clause did not guarantee that the 
Forest Service would follow a particular procedure or statutory 
requirement in devising the protective measures listed in CT 6.25.  
Although the clause referred to the ESA, that reference merely 
explained the source of the special measures and did not impose 
obligations on the Forest Service . . . .107 
In so doing, the court appears to be breaking new ground, raising 
the bar, and setting forth: 
a new standard for establishing a breach of the Government’s duty 
to cooperate and not to hinder where the alleged breach is based 
on Government delay.  Before Precision Pine, most cases addressing 
such allegations focused on whether the Government’s delay was 
objectively unreasonable.  Precision Pine, by contrast, appears to 
require something more akin to bad faith—evidence that the 
Government engaged in action “specifically targeted” at the other 
party, and that this action attempts to reappropriate a benefit 
guaranteed by the contract. 108 
At least one other observer questioned whether the court found ill-
conceived linkages between disparate types of unique government 
contracts, specifically those dealing with savings and loan institutions 
and those involving timber sales.  “The . . . court believes that all 
Government contracts are the same . . . [and] that it can state a 
generic rule of contract law that applies to all types of contracts.  We 
                                                 
 107. Daniel P. Graham, Tara L. Ward & Craig Smith, Feature Comment:  Fed. Cir. 
Resets Standard for Breach of the Duty to Cooperate and Not to Hinder, 52 GOV’T 
CONTRACTOR ¶ 97, Mar. 18, 2010, at 3–4. 
 108. Id. at 1.  The comment also asserts that:  “First, the Court’s newly articulated 
standard appears inconsistent with precedent[,] . . . [S]econd, the Precision Pine panel 
decision departs from well-established and widely cited common law principles.  
Restatement 205 comment (d), cited in Precision Pine, states that a party to a contract 
violates its duty of good faith and fair dealing (of which the duty to cooperate and 
not to hinder is a part) if that party unreasonably acts or fails to act . . . [, and] 
[f]inally, neither party briefed or argued for the standard adopted by the Precision 
Pine panel. Id. at 5–6. 
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don’t believe this is sound reasoning, and it is particularly troubling 
when such concepts are imported into procurement contracts.”109 
I share the concern that conventional FAR-based procurement 
contracts are poor analogues to the court’s S&L and timber 
experiences.  I also agree that the government routinely benefits 
from the implicit understandings that animate these contracts.  
Indeed, I share the concern that, if taken to its logical conclusion and 
applied broadly, Precision Pine could encourage contractors to offer 
less favorable pricing to its government customers, as contractors 
engage in risk-averse behavior and increase their pricing to account 
for, or insure against, the government’s license to engage in 
uncooperative behavior.  That would be a tragic result. 
Contractors selling supplies and services to the Government have 
traditionally priced such supplies and services on the basis that the 
law will protect them from unreasonable conduct by the 
Government during the performance of the conduct.  This belief 
has been fostered by decades of decisions by the boards of contract 
appeals and the courts granting equitable adjustments, price 
adjustments, or damages when the Government does not meet this 
reasonableness standard.  The Government has been the major 
beneficiary of this traditional view in that, while it has occasionally 
been required to pay additional compensation to a contractor, it 
has obtained lower prices on many, if not most, of its 
procurements. 
 Perhaps the court is right in raising the standard with regard to 
savings and loan institutions and buyers of timber.  The savings and 
loan litigation is all in the past tense[,] and the fact that the 
Government will get a lower price for its timber probably will not 
have a great effect on the treasury.  But higher prices on the $500 
billion worth of procurement contracts that are awarded each year 
are a serious matter.  We desperately need the court to think 
through the impact of these generic rules that it is formulating and 
give assurance to contractors selling supplies and services to the 
Government that they can expect reasonable performance by the 
agency with which they deal.110 
On a more positive note, in Donley v. Lockheed Martin,111 the Federal 
Circuit appears to have rendered a relatively routine Cost Accounting 
Standards (CAS) opinion.  One senses, however, that this opinion’s 
brevity may mask its impact in light of a two current trends:  (1) the 
government-wide effort to make the government more transparent 
                                                 
 109. Ralph C. Nash, Postscript:  Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,  
24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 22, at 67–68 (May 2010). 
 110. Id.  
 111. 608 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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and (2) mounting tension between the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) and its constituents. 
Judge Bryson explained that this case derived from the “rephasing” 
of the 1991 contract between Lockheed Martin and the Air Force for 
the development of F-22 aircraft.112  Not long after the contract award, 
both parties faced impediments.  “In 1992, the Air Force informed 
Lockheed that it anticipated a funding shortfall for the F-22 program.  
At the same time, Lockheed told the Air Force that it expected the 
costs of the F-22 project to increase.”113  The Air Force approached 
Lockheed Martin about rephasing the contract and sought estimates 
based on, among other things, deleting two aircraft and addressing 
certain weight related challenges.  Later in the year, the government 
modified the contract to mandate the rephasing. 
Concurrent with this effort, the Air Force encouraged Lockheed 
Martin (and certain other contractors) to alter its (and their) cost 
accounting practices.  Specifically, “the government urged Lockheed 
to change its accounting practices and directly charge certain 
personnel costs to the F-22 contract.”114  After voicing concern, 
Lockheed Martin agreed to do so.  The changes to accounting 
practices were not insignificant.  Lockheed Martin estimated, at the 
time, that they would exceed $10 million.  
A number of years later, the DCAA “concluded that the change in 
Lockheed’s accounting practices caused a significant increase in the 
cost to the United States of the F-22 contract.”115  In 2002, a new 
contracting officer agreed with DCAA and issued a decision asserting 
a government claim of approximately $14.7 million.  The 
government, however, failed to convince either the Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or the Federal Circuit that there 
was a change in accounting practice that increased the price on an 
“affected contract.”116  Rather, “the parties created a wholly new cost 
estimate[.]”117 
                                                 
 112. Id. at 1354. 
 113. Id. at 1350. 
 114. Id. at 1351. 
 115. Id. at 1352. 
 116. Id. at 1354 (“The critical inquiry under the FAR provision that defines an 
‘affected contract’ is not whether there is an entirely new contract; it is whether costs 
were estimated under one accounting practice but reported under another.  The 
Board answered that factual question in the negative.”).  
 117. Id. at 1355; see, e.g., Terry L. Albertson & Linda S. Bruggeman, Feature 
Comment:  Donley v. Lockheed Martin Corp.:  Only Contracts ‘Affected’ By Accounting 
Change Are Subject To Price Adjustment, 52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 363 (Nov. 10, 2010) 
(providing an in depth discussion of this issue).  Mr. Albertson and Ms. Bruggeman 
were counsel of record for Lockheed Martin for the ASBCA proceedings; Mr. 
Albertson argued the case before the Federal Circuit.  The authors suggest that 
“[t]his is an important decision that interprets for the first time the meaning of 
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Both the ASBCA and the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the 
ASBCA’s decision, approached this dispute as a matter in which the 
new contracting officer basically rejected the pre-existing bargain 
between the contracting parties.  Neither the board of contract 
appeals nor the appellate court would permit the government to 
suggest that the original bargain between the contracting parties 
failed due to a lack of authority on the part of the initial contracting 
officer.118  It seems reasonable to hope that, in the future, the case 
serves as a good example of the benefits of transparent business 
dealings. 
[T]he government’s contention that Lockheed “did not disclose its 
intent to remove the F-22 contract from the universe of CAS-
affected contracts” and “failed to fully disclose the effect of its 
increased cost to the Government” is totally without merit.  The 
Board found, with considerable evidentiary support, that Lockheed 
made the cost effects of its accounting changes clear to the Air 
Force negotiators and that they understood the effects of those 
changes.119 
The Obama administration has maintained its commitment to 
transparency,120 and the contractor community—for legitimate 
reasons—views many of the transparency related initiatives with fear 
and skepticism.121  But transparency—at least sometimes—can benefit 
                                                 
‘affected’ contract, and which could also determine whether price adjustments must 
be made in other circumstances.”  Id. at 3. 
 118. As the ASBCA explained:  “We conclude that CAS administration 
requirements do not supersede or permit restructuring of the results of the parties’ 
arms length price negotiations conducted by the Air Force with full knowledge and 
integration of the changed practices. The PCO had authority to negotiate the 
rephrased contract price.”  Appeal of Lockheed Martin Corporation, ASBCA No. 
53822, 07-2 BCA ¶ 33,614 at 21. 
 119. Donley, 608 F.3d at 1355. 
 120. “My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of 
openness in Government.”  Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies:  Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,685 (Jan. 26, 
2009); see also Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies:  
Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,683 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“A democracy 
requires accountability, and accountability requires transparency.  As Justice Louis 
Brandeis wrote, ‘sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.’”). 
 121. See, e.g., The Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information  
System, PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, available at 
http://www.ppirs.gov/fapiis.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (describing FAPIIS as 
“an information system that contains specific information on the integrity and 
performance of covered Federal agency contractors and grantees”); see also New Law 
Requires Public Posting Of Contractor Responsibility Data, 52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 281, 
Aug. 18, 2010, at 7  (stating that “[t]he Professional Services Council warns that 
publicly releasing FAPIIS [contractor qualification and misconduct] data could 
create ‘a politically motivated blacklist of vendors and improperly limit the 
Government’s ability to access the best qualified vendors in the marketplace’”); 
Gloria Sochon, Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS):  
Spotlight on Contractor Responsibility, CONT. MGMT. 36, 39–40 (Jan. 2011) (describing 
the types of information that must be reported to FAPIIS). 
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the contractor in dealing with its government customer.  For that 
reason, it is heartening to see the Federal Circuit affirm the fact 
findings of the ASBCA.122 
The case should also interest both contractors and agency 
personnel frustrated with their current business relationship with 
DCAA.123  Expressing a sense of déjà vu earlier this year, Vern 
Edwards referred to the Arthur Anderson report that accompanied 
the 1986 Packard Commission Report, which, twenty five years later, 
seems eerily current. 
 Deterioration of the contracting officer’s authority as the 
government’s team leader together with an apparent increase in 
DCAA’s authority appears to be a principal cause of the duplication 
and inefficiency in the audit and oversight process.  There is a 
perception among contractors that DCAA is marching to its own drummer, 
who may or may not be playing the same tune as the rest of the 
government. . . .  Contractors believe that the practical . . . result . . . 
has been a change in the role of DCAA auditor from adviser to 
decision maker and negotiator.  In this latter role, contractors see 
DCAA as generally inflexible and [Administrative Contracting 
Officers] as reluctant to take a position contrary to DCAA because 
of concern about being subjected to criticism.  The net effect of this 
situation is a procurement environment fraught with indecision, delays, 
and unnecessary and costly disputes. 
. . . [A]t times, contracting officers simply find it easier to “go 
along” with DCAA than to challenge the auditor’s position.  This is 
precisely the perception that many contractors have of the 
contracting officer in today’s environment. 
. . . . 
. . . [A DCAA representative responded that DCAA] should be 
under no constraint as to what it can say or challenge. . . .  DCAA’s 
purpose is not to support the [contracting officer]’s procurement 
objectives, but rather to protect the taxpayers’ dollars. . . .  [H]e 
sees DCAA as having to be “independent” from both contractors 
and contracting officers. . . .  [I]t is not difficult to see how internal 
disagreements, “turf battles,” and lack of communication can occur, and 
                                                 
 122. Indeed, as a general rule, CAS cases seem like a particularly logical place for 
the Federal Circuit to defer to both the finder of fact and the board judges’ superior 
expertise and familiarity with this regime. 
 123. See, e.g., Vernon J. Edwards, Reliving History:  The New DOD Policy On Resolution 
Of Contract Audit Recommendations, 24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 3, at 11 (Jan. 2010) 
(discussing, among other things, a 1984 Cuneo Lecture at the Army Judge Advocate 
General’s School, in which Lockheed’s John Cavanaugh said:  “Industry reaction has 
been that in effect the contracting officer is being required to share his authority 
with government auditors, who in the past have had an advisory role”). 
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how this can lead to the lack of coordination and efficiency in the audit and 
oversight process experienced by the contractors . . . .124 
History repeats itself.  Edwards opines that:  “Taken individually, 
these limitations on [contracting officer] authority and increases of 
auditor authority may be unobjectionable.  However, in today’s 
environment, and when considered in their totality, they appear to 
have a significant chilling effect on [contracting officer’s] 
performance of their duty to personally and independently issue final 
decisions on contractors’ claims.”125   
Returning to the cases, I also struggled with M. Maropakis Carpentry, 
Inc. v. United States,126 one of the court’s most formalistic decisions.127  
As discussed below, I was not alone. 
Maropakis completed the contract, for roof and window 
replacement, more than a year late.  Maropakis put forward a 
number of alleged excuses or justifications for its delayed 
performance, including the inability to locate a window manufacturer 
and the search for a metal fabricator, the need to re-submit plans, the 
discovery of lead based paint, and the Navy’s prohibition of the use of 
asphalt as a roofing adhesive.128  The contracting officer responded 
“that Maropakis did not ‘present[ ] sufficient justification to warrant 
the time extension’ requested.”129  Subsequently, the contracting 
officer noted Maropakis’ failure to respond to that letter or request a 
contracting officer’s final decision.130  The contracting officer also 
reminded Maropakis that the contract’s liquidated damages clause 
entitled the government to recover $650 from Maropakis for each day 
after the passage of the modified delivery date.131  After an additional 
exchange of correspondence, the contracting officer rendered a 
decision demanding approximately $300,000 in liquidated 
damages.132 
                                                 
 124. THE PRESIDENT’S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, Conduct 
and Accountability:  A Report to the President, app. D at 135–36 (June 1986) (emphasis 
added). 
 125. Edwards, Reliving History, supra note 123, at 12 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Role of the Auditor:  Any Room Left for the Contracting 
Officer?,  
1 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 66 (1987)); see also Thomas P. Barletta & William T. Keevan, 
Feature Comment:  Legal, Accounting and Practical Considerations in Responding to DCAA 
Audits of Contractor Internal Controls Systems, 33 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 298,  
Sept. 1, 2010, at 8 (“DCAA’s recent guidance on audits of contractor internal 
controls presents a number of issues and potential risks for contractors . . . .”). 
 126. 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 127. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 3, at 773–75 (discussing “formalism”). 
 128. Maropakis, 609 F.3d at 1325–26. 
 129. Id. at 1326 (omission in original). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1325–26 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 52.211–12). 
 132. Id. at 1326. 
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Maropakis sued in the Court of Federal Claims.133  The court 
eventually dismissed Maropakis’ claim for time extensions and 
granted summary judgment in favor of the government on the 
liquidated damages.134  On appeal, among other things, Maropakis 
asserted “that it was not required to comply with the jurisdictional 
prerequisites of the [Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA)] to assert 
its claim for a time extension as a defense to the government’s 
counterclaim for liquidated damages.”135 
With regard to its claim for time extensions, the majority 
concluded that “there is nothing in the CDA that excuses contractor 
compliance with the explicit CDA claim requirements.”136  
Accordingly, the majority held that the trial court “correctly dismissed 
Maropakis’s breach of contract claim for lack of jurisdiction.”137  
Similarly, with regard to the liquidated damages, the majority held 
that “the Court of Federal Claims correctly required Maropakis to 
comply with the CDA requirements notwithstanding Maropakis’s 
styling of its claim as a defense to a government counterclaim[.]”138  
The majority explained: 
The statutory language of the CDA is explicit in requiring a 
contractor to make a valid claim to the contracting officer prior to 
litigating that claim.  The purpose of this requirement is to 
encourage the resolution of disagreements at the contracting 
officer level thereby saving both parties the expense of 
litigation. . . .  Maropakis does not point to any authority that 
provides an exception to the CDA claim requirements when a 
contractor’s claim for contract modification is made in defense to a 
government claim.  And we see no reason to create such an 
exception.  Thus, we hold that a contractor seeking an adjustment of 
contract terms must meet the jurisdictional requirements and procedural 
prerequisites of the CDA, whether asserting the claim against the 
government as an affirmative claim or as a defense to a government 
action.139 
What is particularly striking is that no one disputed the COFC’s 
jurisdiction.  The court conceded that:  (1) the Court of Federal 
Claims had jurisdiction over both Maropakis’s claim relating to the 
liquidated damages and the government’s counterclaim by the 
government; and (2) both parties agreed that certification was 
                                                 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1326–27. 
 135. Id. at 1327. 
 136. Id. at 1329. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1331. 
 139. Id. at 1331 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see 48 C.F.R.  
§ 33.204; see also Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
2011] 2010 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS 1097 
unnecessary for the liquidated damages claim; the contracting 
officer’s final decision on that issue was proper.140 
Accordingly, in light of the discussion, above, it is only fitting that 
Judge Newman dissented, vigorously, in this case. 
The issue here is not whether Maropakis perfected a monetary 
claim of its own, but whether Maropakis is to be permitted to 
defend against the government’s claim.  No rule or precedent 
holds that a contractor forfeits its right of defense if it does not file 
its own claim.  And the court is misguided in its ruling that the 
government’s claim for damages cannot be defended against unless 
the contractor first undertakes the formal procedures of contract 
modification. . . . 
 The right to defend against an adverse claim is not a matter of 
“jurisdiction,” nor of grace; it is a matter of right.141 
Like many commentators, I find myself aligned with the dissent.142  
Historically, there seems no debate that the government’s demand 
for liquidated damages is, well, a government claim.  Accordingly, 
familiarity with the CDA leads me to agree with the assertion – 
indeed, I find it seemingly axiomatic – that  “a defense to a 
government claim is not a request for a contract modification—it is 
simply a defense and nothing more.”143 
Prior decisions of both the [BCA’s] and the COFC’s predecessor 
courts have discussed the difference between a contractor’s 
affirmative CDA claims arising out of or relating to the contract to 
combat a liquidated damages assessment versus a contractor’s 
defenses against an assessment through an attack of its factual 
underpinnings.  The key to understanding this distinction is in the 
form of relief requested.  An affirmative CDA claim is an attempt to 
modify or adjust the contract to counter the liquidated damages 
assessment (e.g., compensable time extensions as a result of 
government delays).  A factual defense to a liquidated damages 
assessment merely serves to attack the assessment itself (e.g., the 
government’s assessment was incorrect because the delay was 
excused as a result of government delays).  Plainly stated, a CDA 
claim seeks affirmative relief under the contract through a contract 
                                                 
 140. Maropakis, 609 F.3d at 1330. 
 141. Id. at 1334-35. 
 142. Daniel Seiden, Federal Circuit Says Valid CDA Claim Needed for Jurisdiction to 
Defend Government Claim, 93 FED. CONT. REP. (BNA) 441 (2010) (citing senior bar 
members’ reactions, including:  “It is shocking that the court would ascribe to 
Congress such a bizarre and unjust intent in enacting the Contract Disputes Act”; 
“An unfair formalism creating obstacles to a just result is bad enough, but this is 
appalling”; and describing the decision as “another dismaying performance by the 
Federal Circuit”). 
 143. Id. (citing interview with John Pachter). 
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adjustment; a factual defense only attempts to reduce or eliminate 
the liquidated damages assessment.144 
Despite any confusion that arose leading up to the litigation, “the 
bottom line still should be that there is a difference between an 
affirmative claim for costs due to a government delay versus a factual 
defense that the government’s actions delayed the contract resulting 
in an improper liquidated damages assessment.”145  
 It is difficult to conceive of a more bizarre holding than this rule 
that if a defense looks like an affirmative claim, it can only be 
asserted if it meets the standard of being a proper CDA claim.  We 
can find nothing in the CDA that would lead to this conclusion and 
it surely flies in the face of the congressional purpose of providing 
contractors a fair procedure for resolving disputes.  We never had 
any problem with the holding in Ruhnau-Evans-Ruhnau Associates v. 
U.S., 3 Cl. Ct. 217 (1983), that precludes interest on a Government 
claim unless it is converted into a contractor claim.  However, it is 
far stretch to hold that a contractor cannot even assert a defense to 
a Government claim unless it is converted into a contractor claim.  
We agree with the dissent that this decision is “an affront to the 
principles upon which these courts were founded.”146 
I doubt that Maropakis will prove to be the Federal Circuit’s last 
word on this issue. 
Turning to terminations and breach, in McHugh v. DLT Solutions, 
Inc.,147 the Federal Circuit reversed the Armed Services Board of 
Contract Appeals (ASBCA).  The most significant aspect of the 
dispute is that the court agreed with the ASBCA that the government 
properly terminated the contract for the convenience of the 
government.  “[T]he software was never deployed . . . [and] the 
contracting officer returned all compact disks and software 
documentation relating to the contract . . . .”148 
The unique aspect of the case was the breach claim, which the 
ASBCA granted, but the appellate court rejected.  Prior to the 
termination, the parties modified the contract “to include a non-
substitution clause that prevented [the government] from replacing 
the leased Oracle software with functionally similar software for a 
                                                 
 144. Raymond S.E. Pushkar & Justin M. Ganderson, Federal Circuit Contravenes 
Purposes of CDA in Holding on Government Liquidated Damages Assessments, 94 FED. CONT. 
REP. (BNA) 81 (2010) (emphasis omitted). 
 145. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 146. Ralph C. Nash, Defense to a Government Claim is a Contractor Claim:  A Weird 
Thought, 24 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 42, at 135 (Sept. 2010); see also CDA Procedures 
Apply To Contractor Defense To Government Claim, Fed. Cir. Holds, 52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR 
¶ 225 (June 30, 2010). 
 147. 618 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 148. Id. at 1377–78. 
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period of one year after the expiration or termination of the 
contract.”149  After the termination, the contractor “alleged that the 
government had breached the non-substitution clause of the contract 
by replacing the . . . software with functionally equivalent . . . 
software.”150  Even acknowledging that the government did not use 
the software, the ASBCA “reasoned that the non-substitution clause 
was bargained-for consideration between the parties and was 
binding. . . .  [Accordingly, the government] breached the non-
substitution clause in the contract and was liable for expectation 
damages.”151  
The Federal Circuit rejected the ASBCA’s interpretation of the 
contractual language.  True to form, the court noted that “[c]ontract 
interpretation begins with the plain language of the written 
agreement” and reached for Webster’s Dictionary.152  Finding that 
“[t]he dictionary definition of the word ‘replace’ requires 
substitution of one by another [or] . . . ‘to put something new in the 
place of[,]’” the court found that the government’s use of pre-
existing applications did not amount to replacements.153 
The Federal Circuit addressed a long-simmering cost and pricing 
issue in ATK Thiokol, Inc. v. United States.154  The court affirmed the 
COFC decision155 holding that the Independent Research and 
Development (IR&D) costs at issue had been properly allocated as 
indirect costs under the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) and the 
FAR.156  Even though the courts agreed on the outcome, “[t]he 
Federal Circuit took a more traditional, legalistic approach.”157  Rarely 
have the Federal Circuit’s forays into the CAS concluded as 
efficiently.158  As the contractor’s advocates explained: 
                                                 
 149. Id. at 1377. 
 150. Id. at 1378. 
 151. Id. at 1379.  Given the ASBCA’s findings, the award of expectation damages 
for breach of a government contract would be the correct, but nonetheless an 
exceptional, remedy. 
 152. Id. at 1380.  It is not my intent to suggest that this instance, alone, confirms 
that the “court is wedded to dictionaries.”  See, e.g., Nash, Implied Contract to Fairly and 
Honestly Consider an Offer, supra note 86, at 85.  Conversely, I am confident that at 
least some readers will be interested to know that the court relied on the online 
version of Webster’s. 
 153. McHugh, 618 F.3d at 1380. 
 154. 598 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 155. 68 Fed. Cl. 612 (2005), aff’d 598 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 156. Id. at 645. 
 157. Paul E. Pompeo, Practitioner’s Comment:  Fed. Cir. Adopts Broad View of IR&D, 52 
GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 129, Apr. 7, 2010, at 12–13 also opining that the “decision 
should not be tallied as a ‘win for contractors’—it benefits both contractors and the 
Government”). 
 158. No doubt, however, the government must have been frustrated by how little 
traction its arguments achieved.  Nor does the court offer an explanation for the 
more than four year period required for the appeal to be resolved. 
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 For the last four decades . . . there has been much debate 
regarding when contractors can recover R&D costs as indirect 
costs, or [IR&D] costs, spread over multiple contracts, as opposed 
to direct costs of a single contract.  This debate centers on the 
regulatory requirement that R&D costs are recoverable as indirect 
IR&D costs unless the R&D effort is “required in the performance 
of a contract.”. . . 
 . . . [T]he court] held that R&D effort is only “required in the 
performance of a contract” when the effort is specifically required 
by a contract’s terms. . . . 
 . . . [This] should end much of the uncertainty . . . .  
The . . . decision . . . provides added confidence to contractors that 
their adherence to the terms of their [CAS] Disclosure Statements 
will guide whether R&D costs are properly classified as indirect 
costs under CAS 420 and are allowable under [FAR] 31.205-18.  
Indeed, the Federal Circuit affirmed that contractors, within the broad 
parameters established by the CAS, are free to adopt cost accounting 
practices that make sense for their businesses and that, once established and 
not otherwise non-compliant, bind the contractor and the government.  
 Finally, the . . . decision provides guidance on proper contractor 
accounting for bid and proposal (B&P) costs, costs that are similar 
to IR&D costs and governed by the same regulatory framework.159 
As a related aside, I was surprised, in September, by the passage on 
IR&D costs contained in Under Secretary of Defense Ashton Carters’ 
Better Buying Power memorandum, promoting his high-profile 
efficiency and productivity initiative.160  Carter reported that DoD 
“reimburses industry as an allowable cost over $3 billion annually” in 
IR&D.161   
The paltry sum was stunning.  Carter suggested that “there is some 
evidence that the defense industry has reduced its in-house 
laboratory infrastructure to a point not envisioned in the 1990s[,]”162 
which seems particularly disturbing given the government’s currently 
meager level of investment in path-breaking research and its future 
prospects in light of the government’s dire fiscal condition.  
                                                 
 159. Thomas A. Lemmer, et al., Maximizing Contractor Recovery of IR&D Costs:  
Federal Circuit Affirms ATK Thiokol, 45 PROCUREMENT LAW., Summer 2010, at 27,  
27–28 (emphasis added); see also Thomas A. Lemmer & Phillip R. Seckman, Federal 
Circuit Provides Needed Clarity on Proper Classification of IR&D Costs, 93 FED. CONT. REP. 
(BNA) 286 (2010) (summarizing ATK Thiokol). 
 160. See Memorandum from Ashton B. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Professionals, Better Buying Power:  Guidance for Obtaining Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (Sept. 14, 2010), available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/docs/USD_ATL_Guidance_Memo_September_14_2010_FI
NAL.PDF.  
 161. Id. at 8. 
 162. Id. 
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Moreover, it was also intriguing to read Carter’s perspective on 
limited visibility into contractor’s “independent” efforts, particularly 
as he bemoaned that DOD lacks “insight into how or where these 
funds go or if they benefit the Department or promote the 
technological prowess of our industry.”163  As is the case with many of 
these initiatives, it will be fascinating to learn, over time, which 
reforms, if any, take hold at DoD. 
C. Winstar Cases 
In Holland v. United States,164 the court noted that this was one of the 
last in a long line of cases165 which stemmed from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Winstar Corp.166  Winstar, of course, 
opened the door for certain financial institutions to recover damages 
when the government, by legislation, in effect broke its promises to 
allow the plaintiffs to use special accounting methods to salvage failed 
thrifts.167  While that long procession of cases may be drawing to a 
close, the precedents that flowed from those cases—including 
Holland—are likely to echo for many years to come.  It remains a 
matter of some debate, of course, what impact these cases will have—
in the short or the long-term—on traditional government contracts.168   
In Holland, the court reversed a 2008 decision of the Court of 
Federal Claims, in which the trial court held the government liable 
for $18 million in damages.169  Plaintiffs, investors that had acquired 
                                                 
 163. Id. 
 164. 621 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 165. Id. at 1373. 
 166. 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 
 167. Id. at 909–10.  See generally Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
The S&L Crisis:  A Chrono-Bibliography, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/ 
(last updated Dec. 20, 2002) (summarizing key events in the Savings and Loan 
Crisis). 
 168. See, e.g., Michael R. Rizzo & Virginia M. Gomez, Erosion of the Sovereign Acts 
Doctrine?  How Recent Winstar and Spent Nuclear Fuel Litigation Impacts Government 
Contractors, 42 PROCUREMENT LAW., Spring 2007, at 3  suggesting that:  “Contractors 
should keep in mind that (1) the courts are inclined to review this new generation of 
breach of contract claims on a case-by-case basis and to construe strictly the terms 
and circumstances of the particular contract, and some judges and courts still look 
for exceptions to shield the Government from large damage awards; (2) the 
Government will undoubtedly attempt to insert risk-shifting or non-liability 
provisions into contracts that expressly protect it from the consequences of 
regulatory or statutory change; and, as a result, (3) contractors that decide to bring 
breach of contract claims arising out of regulatory or legislative changes that alter 
the Government’s existing contractual obligations should be prepared for potentially 
long and expensive litigation.”; see also Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the Sovereign 
Acts and Unmistakability Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar:  An Interim Report, 51 ALA. L. 
REV. 1177, 1179 (2000) (arguing that Winstar has not “effected any radical change in 
the law respecting the liability of the United States for retroactive legislation affecting 
the government’s contractual undertakings”). 
 169. Holland v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 681, 699 (2009), rev’d 621 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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failing thrifts under assistance agreements with the Federal Savings 
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), claimed (as is the norm in 
the Winstar cases) that those agreements were breached by Congress’ 
enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which erased many of the 
regulatory benefits previously agreed to by the FSLIC under the 
assistance agreements.170  The government argued, however, that the 
plaintiffs’ claims had been erased by a settlement agreement that the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) entered into with 
certain involved parties.171  Under that settlement agreement, the 
FDIC agreed, inter alia, to pay $3.3 million in financial assistance as 
“full satisfaction of any and all remaining payments or contributions 
due or to become due under the Assistance Agreements.”172 
Noting that the case presented an “unusual factual situation,”173 the 
Federal Circuit relied narrowly on Illinois law (the law governing the 
settlement agreement)174 to conclude that “Plaintiffs’ release of all 
claims against the FDIC . . . in the Settlement Agreement also 
effected a release of all claims against its co-obligor, the [Office of 
Thrift Supervision].”175  Because the settlement agreement did not 
explicitly exclude the regulatory promises that had earlier been made 
to plaintiffs, the Federal Circuit held that the settlement agreement 
covered the government’s obligations under those regulatory 
promises, as well.176 
On its face, the decision is highly fact-specific, and arguably may be 
limited to the unique circumstances of the Holland case.  It is 
possible, however, that the Holland decision may have a broader 
impact.  In the coming years, as budgetary pressures grow, federal 
agencies will be more likely to rely upon private capital and 
investment to accomplish public objectives and missions.177  In 
                                                 
 170. Id. at 687. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 686. 
 173. Holland, 621 F.3d at 1373–74. 
 174. Id. at 1383 (“Neither party has pointed to any ‘controlling federal law’ on the 
effect of an accord and satisfaction with one co-obligor on other co-obligors.  Thus, 
pursuant to the choice-of-law provision of the Settlement Agreement, we will analyze 
the issue under Illinois law.”). 
 175. Id. at 1384; see also id. at 1377–78 (clarifying that “release and accord and 
satisfaction are distinct contractual defenses[,]” but concluding, nonetheless, that 
“an agreement may constitute both a release and an accord and satisfaction, either of 
which may bar future claims”). 
 176. Id. at 1383. 
 177. I fervently hope that the modern-era financial crisis and the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) will not spawn a comparable generation of litigation.  See, 
e.g., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT EXAMINING 
TREASURY’S USE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTRACTING AUTHORITY (Oct. 14, 2010), 
available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-101410-report.pdf.  One familiar 
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resolving problems that arise under those increasingly complicated 
arrangements, which are likely to span multiple agencies, private 
parties will have to be careful not to surrender too much in 
settlements with individual agencies.  In light of Holland, it will be 
important to exclude other potential claims, against other agencies, 
in any settlement with an individual agency. 
Anchor Savings Bank v. United States178 is another of the vanishing 
breed of Winstar cases.  The plaintiff bank had been forced to sell a 
valuable asset, a mortgage banking company, as a result of the capital 
shortfall when its regulatory agreements with the government were 
undermined by the FIRREA legislation.179  Plaintiff sought damages, 
including lost profits, for that divestiture.  After a long trial, the Court 
of Federal Claims awarded plaintiffs approximately $382 million in 
damages, including, in part, lost profits.180  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit held that lost profits are, under certain circumstances, 
recoverable from the government, so long as (1) the lost profits were 
reasonably foreseeable, (2) the loss of profits was caused by the 
government’s breach, and (3) the amount of the lost profits has been 
established with reasonable certainty.181   
The government argued that Anchor’s purchase and then forced 
sale of the asset were not reasonably foreseeable by the government, 
and so the damages were not recoverable.182  The Federal Circuit 
disagreed, however, and held that the trial court had  
                                                 
refrain voiced by the Congressional Oversight Panel resonated with me:  “Initially, 
Treasury did not have enough trained [contracting officer’s technical representatives 
(COTRs)] to manage the contracts, so it assigned a number of its senior officials as 
COTRs.  Given the limited timeframe for executing the program, some of these 
officials were assigned COTR responsibilities without receiving formal training in 
their acquisition-related responsibilities.  While Treasury replaced the senior-level 
COTRs with certified COTRs over time, the fact that officials without proper 
procurement training were charged with the administration and monitoring of 
contracts for a time potentially impeded efforts to implement effectively and oversee 
the TARP.”  Id. at 44.  The federal government’s consistent failure to staff the 
contract administration function is as well documented as it depressing.  See, e.g., 
Schooner & Greenspahn, supra note 63, at 16; Steven L. Schooner, Contractor 
Atrocities at Abu Ghraib:  Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced 
Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 557 (2005) (noting that “[l]ack of training 
was not only evident on the side of the contractors.  Military personnel themselves 
did not have the necessary training in the area of contract administration to 
adequately monitor and oversee the contracts”). 
 178. 597 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 179. Id. at 1359–60. 
 180. Anchor Sav. Bank v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 1, 153 (2008) (the damages 
decision on appeal), aff’d in part and remanded in part 597 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
see also Anchor Sav. Bank v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 406, 421 (2002) (the preceding 
liability decision). 
 181. Anchor Sav. Bank, 597 F.3d at 1361 (citing authorities).  Each of these 
inquiries, the Federal Circuit noted, “presents a question of fact as to which we 
exercise ‘clear error’ review.’”  Id. 
 182. Id. at 1630. 
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properly required only a general showing that (1) the government 
could reasonably have foreseen that the influx of supervisory 
goodwill under [the regulatory agreements] would cause the . . . 
institution to make investments in order to generate profit and 
rehabilitate the failing acquired thrifts; and (2) the government 
could reasonably have foreseen that a breach of contract would 
cause the acquiring institution to sell off those very investments in 
order to raise capital to meet the regulatory requirements.183 
Under this more expansive test, the court held that the trial court did 
not commit clear error in finding that Anchor’s loss was 
foreseeable.184 
The ability of Winstar plaintiffs to recover lost profits differs 
markedly from traditional government contracts cases.185  The court’s 
introduction to its damages analysis describes a familiar common-law 
solution, but one that, for most part, is divorced from federal 
government contracting remedies.  “Damages for breach of contract 
are designed to make the non-breaching party whole.  One way to 
accomplish that objective is to award ‘expectancy damages,’ i.e., the 
benefits the non-breaching party would have expected to receive had 
the breach not occurred.  Expectancy damages ‘are often equated 
with lost profits, although they can include other damage elements as 
well.’”186  
Under traditional federal contracting cases, which typically arise 
out of lengthy, specific, standardized federal procurement contracts, 
the courts and the boards have been reluctant to allow lost profits 
because damages under those contracts are typically defined by 
heavily regulated and closely drafted remedy-granting clauses.  
Indeed, the government’s extensive use of remedy-granting clauses 
causes what the common-law would deem breaches to remain within 
the contract’s remedial scheme.187  The contrast between the more 
                                                 
 183. Id. at 1363 (rejecting the government’s attempt to draw a more stringent 
foreseeability test from Federal Circuit case law). 
 184. Id. at 1364. 
 185. See, e.g., Rodger D. Citron, Lessons From the Damages Decisions Following United 
States v. Winstar Corp., 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 32 (2002) (interpreting the courts’ 
traditional refusal to asses expectancy damages against the government as a vestige of 
the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity); Jon W. Burd, Note, Where the Rabbit Hole 
Ends:  A Working Model For Measuring Winstar-Type Damages in the Federal Circuit, 13 
FED. CIR. B.J. 657, 673 (2004) (explaining that expectancy damages, while 
commonplace in run of the mill contract cases, remain novel in the government 
contracts context). 
 186. Anchor Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 597 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(citing Glendale Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 239 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (recounting blackletter law concerning the basis for expectancy damages)). 
 187. It is easy to contrast the government’s typical remedy-granting clause regime: 
  [P]arties to government contracts use standardized remedy-granting 
clauses to allocate the risk of anticipated and unforeseen contingencies 
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expansive Winstar damages and the traditional presumption against 
lost profits under government contracts suggests that, as the 
government embarks on more complex commercial arrangements in 
the future, the government may attempt, by contract, to limit the 
remedies available to exclude the recovery of expectancy damages by 
the private parties potentially injured by government actions. 
D. Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Arguably the most intriguing case of the year, Nebraska Public Power 
District v. United States, not only involved a dozen Federal Circuit 
judges, but also pitted the exclusivity of the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims against the generalist federal courts.  Of course, it also 
involves the long-running Spent Nuclear Fuel saga.188  The delays 
                                                 
between the parties.  The implicit premise of these clauses is that they (1) 
dissuade contractors from padding their bids, offers, or proposals when 
competing for government business, and (2) reassure those contractors that 
the government will equitably adjust contracts to reimburse for unforeseen 
contingencies.  This “contingency promise” essentially provides that in 
exchange for the contractor’s willingness not to inflate its contract price to 
insulate itself against certain potential, although unknown, liabilities, the 
government agrees to make the contractor whole when such liabilities are 
incurred.  
  During the performance of government contracts, if an unanticipated 
contingency arises that requires the contractor to incur additional costs, the 
parties have a number of options.  The contracting officer and the 
contractor can agree upon compensation and bilaterally modify their 
contract.  Alternatively, the contracting officer can unilaterally determine 
the additional compensation to be paid.  If the contractor is dissatisfied with 
the amount of compensation, it can file a claim, which commences the 
disputes process.  
Steven L. Schooner & Erin Siuda-Pfeffer, Post-Katrina Reconstruction Liability:  Exposing 
the Inferior Risk-Bearer, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287, 319–20 (2006). 
 188. This brief coverage, of course, cannot do justice to this topic, but recent 
commentary builds upon a rich source of analysis.  See generally Marta Adams, Yucca 
Mountain-Nevada’s Perspective, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 423 (2010) (evincing typical NIMBY 
enthusiasm for the political derailment of the Yucca Mountain project); Thomas B. 
Cochran & Geoffrey H. Fettus, Response:  NRDC’s Perspective on the Nuclear Waste 
Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10791, 10792 (2010) (staking out the stark position that 
“the process of developing, licensing, and setting environmental and oversight 
standards for the proposed repository were repeatedly rigged or dramatically 
weakened to ensure the licensing of the proposed site rather than to provide safety 
for the length of time that the waste is dangerous”); Charles de Saillan, Disposal of 
Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States and Europe:  A Persistent Environmental Problem,  
34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 461 (2010) (providing a broad survey of how the disposal 
issue is handled internationally); David R. Hill, Response:  The NWPA and the Realities of 
our Current Situation, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10795 (2010) (taking the position that “while 
[the statutory regime governing nuclear energy] may have significant problems and 
difficulties, [it] is worth salvaging); Richard B. Stewart, Solving the U.S. Nuclear Waste 
Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10783 (2010) (cautioning that the primary lesson of the 
Yucca Mountain boondoggle is that any future repository project must include “the 
informed assent of the public and of host localities”); Daniel T. Swanson, Response:  
NWPA Is Still a Viable Option for Solving the Nuclear Waste Dilemma, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10800 (2010) (arguing that there is still hope for Congress to create a permanent 
repository under the current legislation).  The last four sources are most readily 
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associated with the construction and operation of the Yucca 
Mountain nuclear fuel repository generated endless litigation 
involving tens of billions of dollars of potential damages due under 
the Energy Department’s Standard Contract.  Still, I remain far more 
troubled that, today, after two decades of study, construction, and, of 
course, litigation, the federal government appears to have no viable 
alternative solution on the horizon for this significant problem.189  
Recent events involving the state of Japan’s nuclear industry following 
the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami serve as a potent reminder 
of the stakes involved.190 
Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA),191 the United 
States Department of Energy (DOE) entered into contracts—referred 
to as the “Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste”—with nuclear power 
producers, including Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD), to 
dispose of the radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel that the 
producers’ power plants generated.192  The deal was relatively simple.  
The nuclear power producers paid fees with the understanding that 
DOE would begin picking up and disposing of the spent nuclear fuel 
no later than January 31, 1998.193  The producers have paid their fees; 
indeed, the court notes that the utilities pay $750 million into the 
spent nuclear fuel fund annually.194  Despite DOE’s stated 
                                                 
available via the Environmental Law Reporter’s online database at 
http://www.elr.info/NewsAnalysis/nasearch.cfm.   
 189. “While DOE reaffirms its obligations to take possession and dispose of the 
nation’s spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste, the Secretary of Energy has 
decided that a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain is not a workable option for 
long-term disposition of the materials.”  U.S. Department of Energy Motion to 
Withdraw, In re U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), No. 63-001 (N.R.C. 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board March 3, 2010) (withdrawing application for a 
license for a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain and noting that the Blue 
Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future will undertake a review of 
alternative solutions), available at  
http://www.energy.gov/news/documents/DOE_Motion_to_Withdraw.pdf.   
See generally Key Issues, Repository Development, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, 
http://www.nei.org/keyissues/nuclearwastedisposal/yuccamountain (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2011); Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum-Blue Ribbon Commission on 
America’s Nuclear Future (Jan. 29, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/presidential-memorandum-blue-ribbon-commission-americas-nuclear-
future, (“[T]he Nation’s approach, developed more than 20 years ago, to managing 
materials derived from nuclear activities, including nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, 
has not proven effective.”).  
 190. Eric Niiler, Japanese Nuclear Crisis Boosts Interest in At Home Radiation 
Monitoring, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/japanese-nuclear-crisis-boosts-interest-in-
at-home-radiation-monitoring/2011/03/21/ABS0DA8_story.html. 
 191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2006). 
 192. 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2010). 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5)(B).   
 194. NPPD II, 590 F.3d 1357, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).   
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confidence,195 no spent nuclear fuel has been collected.  DOE then 
“took the position . . . that it did not have an unconditional 
obligation under the statute or the Standard Contract to accept 
nuclear waste by . . . 1998 . . . .  [Rather,] the statutory deadline did 
not apply if DOE did not have a facility available to accept nuclear 
waste by that date.”196  Not surprisingly, litigation resulted, including 
dozens of breach of contract actions commenced in the Court of 
Federal Claims.197 
Many suits were filed elsewhere, and, in 1996, an important 
development played out in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit.  In Indiana Michigan Power District v. United States,198 the D.C. 
Circuit concluded that DOE had an unconditional obligation under 
the NWPA to accept spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998.199  Then, 
in 1997, in Northern States Power Co. v. Department of Energy,200 the D.C. 
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering the DOE to proceed with 
contractual remedies consistent with NWPA’s mandate.201 Intending 
to leave no wiggle room, the D.C. Circuit specifically denied DOE the 
ability to invoke the standard contract’s Unavoidable Delays clause.  
As a result, DOE could no longer assert that it was not responsible for 
damages that arose “out of causes beyond the control and without the 
fault or negligence of the party failing to perform.”202 
Nearly a decade later, Court of Federal Claims Judge Francis 
Allegra concluded that the D.C. Circuit had over-reached and that its 
writ of mandamus was void.203  To the extent that Judge Allegra’s 
decision would have allowed DOE, once again, to invoke the 
                                                 
 195. The court explained: 
In response to questions about the remedies that would be available to 
ensure that DOE would perform its contractual obligations in a timely 
fashion, and in particular that it would meet the 1998 deadline, DOE stated, 
“The 1998 date is called for in the Act, and we believe it to be a realistic date.  
Our performance will be judged by meeting this date.” 48 Fed. Reg. at 
16,598. 
Id. at 1360. 
 196. Id. at 1361. 
 197. Neb. Pub. Power Dist. v. United States (NPPD I), 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 673 (2006), 
rev’d, 590 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 198. 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
 199. Id. at 1277. 
 200. 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 201. Id. at 761. 
 202. Id. at 760 (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2010) (Article IX(A) of the contract, 
entitled “Unavoidable Delays by Purchaser or DOE”)). 
 203. NPPD I, 73 Fed. Cl. at 674.  The court admonished that 
[a]ny notion that there is a meaningful distinction between interpreting a 
statute or a regulation so as to control an agency’s interpretation of a 
contract and interpreting the contract itself is belied by a legion of cases in 
this circuit that have construed contracts originating in legislation passed by 
Congress and done so by reference to the underlying statute.   
Id. at 663. 
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Unavoidable Delays clause as a defense, an interlocutory appeal was 
taken to determine “whether the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in Indiana 
Michigan and Northern States are entitled to res judicata effect in the 
proceedings before the Court of Federal Claims.” 204  The court heard 
the case en banc and, in a decision written by Judge Bryson, reversed.  
The Federal Circuit concluded that “the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in 
the Indiana Michigan and Northern States cases were not barred by 
sovereign immunity and should not have been denied res judicata 
effect on that ground.”205 
The court systematically rejected the three rationales put forward 
by the COFC. 
First, based on the analysis of the D.C. Circuit in General Electric and 
the decision of this court in PSEG Nuclear, L.L.C. v. United States, 
465 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2006), . . . section 119 of the NWPA 
authorized the D.C. Circuit to review the utilities’ statutory claim 
arising under section 302 of the Act.  Second, . . . the ‘no adequate 
remedy’ requirement in section 10(c) of the APA does not apply to 
special statutory review provisions such as section 119 of the NWPA.  
Section 10(c) of the APA therefore did not bar the D.C. Circuit 
from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the scope of the 
government’s obligations under section 302 of the NWPA and to 
order appropriate relief to enforce those obligations.  Finally, . . . 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision construing section 302 of the NWPA, 
and its order directing the government to act in accordance with 
the utilities’ rights under that provision, did not improperly 
intrude on the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims to 
address NPPD’s breach of contract claim.206 
The cadre of attorneys immersed in litigating spent nuclear fuel 
cases no doubt have been intrigued by the appellate court’s lengthy 
analysis of these issues.  Most government contracts counsel, however, 
will find them of little utility.  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the D.C. Circuit did not usurp the COFC’s 
prerogatives. 
The D.C. Circuit’s order prohibited the government from using 
contract interpretation as a means of avoiding its statutory 
obligations under section 302, which the D.C. Circuit was 
authorized to do as a means of enforcing the statutory claim that 
was brought before it in the Indiana Michigan case.  Beyond that 
implementation of its statutory ruling, the D.C. Circuit properly left 
                                                 
 204. NPPD II, 590 F.3d at 1363. 
 205. Id. at 1376. 
 206. Id. at 1364–65. 
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all issues of contract breach, enforcement, and remedy to be 
determined in the litigation before the Court of Federal Claims. 207 
Judge Gajarsa dissented vigorously, arguing that the D.C. Circuit 
interpreted the Standard Contract rather than the statute and, in so 
doing “infringe[d] upon the Court of Federal Claims’s exclusive 
Tucker Act jurisdiction over the administration of contract disputes, 
thereby impacting the sovereign immunity of the United States and 
undermining this court’s duty to review the contract decisions of the 
Court of Federal Claims.”208  Judge Gajarsa’s frustration with his 
colleagues is clear, and he sees the majority’s lengthy opinion as no 
more than a bow to the D.C. Circuit.  He concludes:  “I can 
appreciate the majority’s attempt to avoid criticism of a sister court, 
but the sheer mushy applesauce consistency of the majority opinion 
in avoiding a jurisdictional confrontation with the D.C. Circuit should 
be obvious.” 209 
Judges Dyk and Linn, in a pithy concurrence, attempt to cabin 
Judge Gajarsa’s “overreading” of the majority opinion.210 
 The court appears to be unanimous in agreeing that the District 
of Columbia Circuit had jurisdiction to interpret the statute, and 
that the D.C. Circuit did not (and could not) address purely 
remedial questions. . . . [C]ontrary to the dissent, I do not read 
either the D.C. Circuit or the majority here as ordering the 
government to pay money damages (expectancy damages) for 
breach of the agreement.211 
At least one commentator read the Federal Circuit’s decision as 
diminishing the role of the Court of Federal Claims and an invitation 
to forum shop. 
Rather than continuing to limit the reach of Bowen, however, the 
court once more elevated form over substance to open a new front 
in the assault on the jurisdiction of the [COFC].  The [Federal 
Circuit’s] decision allows courts other than the [COFC] to 
interpret contractual provisions whenever the construction of a 
statute influences the outcome of the contractual issues.  
Consequently, [this case] enhances the ability of plaintiffs to forum 
shop while further diminishing the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
[COFC].212 
                                                 
 207. Id. at 1365. 
 208. Id. at 1377 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. at 1386–87. 
 210. Id. at 1376 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 211. Id. at 1376–77. 
 212. Thies, supra note 32, at 1204 (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 
(1988)). 
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This seems extreme.  Dozens of spent nuclear fuel cases have now 
percolated up through the Court of Federal Claims and Federal 
Circuit for more than a decade.  One trial judge analyzed the state of 
play and saw the landscape differently from his colleagues.  He laid 
out his objections, supported them, and stood behind his principles.  
The Federal Circuit properly chose to engage in the matter and, 
given the significance of the issue, provided en banc review.  A 
surprising level of cohesion—favoring the pre-existing status quo—
developed.  The court explained, at great length, its reasoning.  
Moreover, though the trial court had gone so far as to postulate “that 
the mandamus derivatively threatens the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit,”213 the Federal Circuit, with the exception of Judge Gajarsa, 
did not share that concern.  In sum, the system remained intact. 
At no point did the Federal Circuit digress into hand-wringing over 
the sad reality that surrounds the spent nuclear fuel cases.  These 
cases involve a large number of entities engaged in a sophisticated 
business that is heavily regulated by the government.  The 
government—for now a generation—has tied an entire industry’s 
hands with regard to a solution to an immense, complicated 
problem.  The government mandated that private industry contribute 
staggering sums to fund that mandated solution.  The government 
invested much time and energy in that solution, all the while brashly, 
publicly, eschewing a fallback position.  Through no fault of the 
affected industry, the government’s solution stalled and, 
subsequently, entirely derailed.  The government does not wish to 
reimburse the industry for its investment into the spent nuclear fuel 
fund or the damages caused by the solution’s implosion.  There is 
little point in inquiring into whether those funds may be required to 
fund the “next” solution.  The courts must now resolve what, frankly, 
remains a no-win situation.  At least the nuclear industry, the 
attorneys, and the courts are not headed back to square one. 
CONCLUSION:  A CONVERGENCE OF JUSTICE AND RISK ALLOCATION? 
This article concludes with the admittedly unusual matter of 
Agredano v. United States.214  Agredano’s inclusion here is not meant to 
suggest this case is of significance to government contracts 
practitioners.  Rather, unlike most of the cases this year, it speaks 
volumes of how some of the judges on the court view the modern 
                                                 
 213. NPPD I, 73 Fed. Cl. 650, 673–74 (2006) (explaining—or perhaps more 
accurately, speculating—that if the Court of Federal Claims respected the D.C. 
Circuit’s writ of mandamus, then the writ might be off-limits to the Federal Circuit 
on appeal).   
 214. 595 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 994 (2011). 
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court’s role.  As suggested above, it could offer an example of the 
court’s preference for simple, formalistic solutions to complex 
problems.215  But I sense I am not alone in reading this case as one in 
which the court chose to cast itself as a gatekeeper and protector of 
the public fisc rather than the last station at which some minimal 
amount of fairness for those who do business with the government 
will be maintained.  The court succinctly explains: 
Agredano purchased a 1987 Nissan Pathfinder at [a government] 
auction.  The vehicle had been seized by Customs . . . when its 
previous owner attempted to transport marijuana across the 
Mexican border . . . .  While Customs agents detected and removed 
some of the marijuana at that time, more [OK, a mere seventeen 
kilograms, or more than thirty-five pounds] remained in the 
vehicle unbeknownst to Customs or Agredano. Several months 
after the auction, . . . Agredano was traveling in the Pathfinder in 
Mexico with . . . his business partner and brother-in-law.  The two 
men were stopped at a checkpoint by Mexican soldiers who 
inspected the vehicle and found the hidden marijuana.  Both men 
were arrested and spent nearly a year in prison before being 
exonerated by a Mexican appellate court . . . .216 
After being denied a remedy in District Court,217 Agredano sought 
relief in the Court of Federal Claims.  Chief Judge Emily Hewitt 
crafted a lengthy, detailed opinion, in which she determined that the 
government breached its contract when it sold Agredano an 
automobile with a stunning quantity of marijuana hidden inside.218  
Among other things, Judge Hewitt explained that, although 
Agredano knew the cars available at government auctions had been 
seized, he had no knowledge as to where or why they were seized.  
Agredano previously had purchased several vehicles at U.S. 
government auctions without incident.219  In addition, “[p]laintiff was 
unable to open the doors and inspect the interior of the [car] 
directly,”220 and, more significantly, “[e]ven if plaintiff [and his 
colleague] had been able to inspect the interior of the car, the 
                                                 
 215. See Thomas, supra note 3, at 777 (arguing that “a formalist movement is 
afoot” in the Federal Circuit). 
 216. Agredano, 595 F.3d at 1279–80. 
 217. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California 
granted summary judgment against Agredano on his claim under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act claim because—regardless of where the tortious act or omission 
occurred—his arrest occurred in Mexico, a foreign country.  Agredano v. United 
States, No. 02CV2243B, Docket Entry No. 71 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2004) (relying on 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)). 
 218. Agredano v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 416, 452 (2008), rev’d, 595 F.3d 1278 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 994 (2011). 
 219. Id. at 421. 
 220. Id. at 422. 
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testimony at trial established that they, as lay people, would have been 
unlikely to discover the contraband themselves.”221  Indeed, “[s]everal 
Customs agents testified that no layperson could discover hidden 
contraband within a vehicle.”222 
Accordingly, the trial court found an implied-in-fact warranty that 
the automobile was free from contraband at the time of sale.223  
“When plaintiff purchased the [car] from defendant, both parties 
had the same expectation:  that the [car] was free of all contraband.  
That mutual and common expectation is the ‘meeting of minds’ 
within this contract.”224  Specifically, the trial court found that “the ‘as 
is’ clause in the contract does not preclude the existence of a possible 
implied-in-fact warranty in this case because the ‘as is’ clause does not 
cover a situation in which defendant sells the [car] with concealed 
contraband to plaintiff.”225  The trial court awarded Agredano 
$350,000 for attorneys fees incurred during his criminal proceedings 
in Mexico; $48,000 for lost income; $10,000 for medical bills incurred 
from the injuries and illnesses resulting from his imprisonment and 
$80,000 for foreseeable future medical expenses; $12,500 for 
psychiatric bills and $46,500 for reasonably foreseeable future 
psychiatric expenses; $2,600 for automobile’s fair market value; and 
$1,254 for Agredano’s family’s expenses bringing him supplies while 
he was in prison.226   
The Federal Circuit reversed.  The court tersely concluded that:   
Customs’ responsibility to remove contraband from forfeited 
vehicles does not provide a contractual warranty to future 
purchasers of the vehicles that it has done so. . . .  [T]he source of 
any responsibility on the part of Customs to search vehicles and 
remove contraband is its regulatory function[,] and a failure to 
adequately perform this responsibility does not provide a 
contractual remedy.227 
                                                 
 221. Id. at 436. 
 222. Id. at 445. 
 223. Id. at 430. 
 224. Id. at 440. 
 225. Id. at 435.  Moreover, the “evidence at trial is consistent with the court’s 
earlier holding that the ‘as is’ clause does not preclude the existence of an implied-
in-fact warranty,(citation omitted) and demonstrates as well that, as a matter of fact, 
plaintiff could not reasonably have been expected to discover hidden narcotics in the 
Pathfinder.”  Id. at 437. 
 226. See id. at 452 (reciting the laundry list of damages Agredano incurred).  “The 
‘meeting of the minds’ in this case . . . is a mutual, if tacit, understanding, between 
plaintiff and defendant that the Pathfinder was free of all contraband when 
defendant sold the Pathfinder to plaintiff.”  Id. at 430. 
 227. Agredano v. United States, 595 F.3d 1278, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 994 (2011).  Judge Dyk concurred:   
Absent a contractual warranty disclaimer, . . . the sale of an automobile . . . 
likely carries with it an implied-in-fact warranty of fitness, including a 
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Given the trial court’s painstaking analysis, the Federal Circuit’s 
conclusion seems not only incorrect, but unnecessarily timid.  
Contract law serves, in large part, to allocate risk.  As my predecessor 
and colleague Emeritus Professor Ralph Nash explained:   
[R]isk allocation generally occurs only when the results of strict 
enforcement would be harsh.  Hence, this reallocation is probably 
better characterized as a safety valve releasing the pressure 
generated by an agreement that does not satisfactorily resolve a 
problem that occurs during performance.  The price of this safety 
valve is unpredictability.  This price seems worth paying, however, 
to assure that risk allocation between the parties retains some 
degree of balance in terms of the events that actually occur during 
contract performance.228 
The outcome in Agredano, by any objective measure, is harsh.   
An individual purchased an automobile from the government, at 
auction, for under $3,000.  As a direct result, he and his colleague 
sustained epic monetary and non-monetary damages.  The 
government, rather than the individual, Mr. Agredano, was the party 
to the transaction best positioned to avoid the risk associated with, or 
absorb the harm caused by, the government’s failure to fulfill its 
regulatory duty and discover contraband in the vehicle prior to its 
resale.229  Nor is it reasonable to assume that either party anticipated 
this particular risk or this result.  It seems inexplicable that this 
court—of all courts—could conclude that the proper allocation of 
                                                 
warranty that the vehicle does not contain illegal drugs.  [Nonetheless, he 
agrees] that the contract here explicitly disclaimed all warranties [and 
concludes that the] government’s regulatory practice of inspecting such 
vehicles for contraband cannot overcome this disclaimer. 
Id. at 1282 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 228. Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 693, 718 (1966) (primarily discussing pricing provisions). 
 229. Indeed, the United States was the superior risk bearer in this case:   
  The superior risk bearer is the party best positioned to (1) appraise, in 
advance, the likelihood that the risk will occur and the magnitude of the 
harm if it does occur, (2) insure against the risk, either through self-
insurance or market insurance, and (3) bear the cost of the harm. . . .   
  Similarly, the least cost risk avoider is the party best positioned to take 
steps to avoid or minimize the harm. 
Schooner & Siuda-Pfeffer, supra note 187, at 310–11 (citing, inter alia, Christopher J. 
Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 322–23 
(1982); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View at the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Richard A. 
Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:  An 
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977) (analyzing risk allocation in the context 
of contract impossibility)).  But see Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract:  
Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 515–18 
(1999) (suggesting that the allocation of risk to the party best able to bear the risk is 
less appropriate when the government is one of the contracting parties because 
private sector assumptions of efficiency fail when transported to the public sector). 
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risk here—either in this case or a matter of precedent—should 
expose an individual to this type of harm caused directly by 
government action (or inaction) without appropriate government 
compensation.  All of which begs the question:  What is the proper 
role of the Federal Circuit? 
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APPENDIX A 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS ACTIVITY PER FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGE 2010 
Judge 
Participated 
Without Writing 
Drafted 
Decision 
Concurring 
Decision 
Dissenting 
Decision 
Bryson Arctic Slope;  
Ham Investments; 
Pai Corp;  
Sullivan 
Anchor 
Savings; 
ATK Thiokol; 
Donley; 
Nebraska; 
  
Lourie Arctic Slope; 
Ham Investments; 
Holland; 
Maropakis; 
Nebraska; 
Precision Pine;  
Resource 
McHugh   
Newman Anchor Savings; 
Bormes; 
Maropakis; 
Nebraska; 
Savantage 
   
Prost Nebraska; 
Pai Corp; 
Savantage 
Holland; 
Precision Pine 
  
Rader Anchor Savings; 
Ham Investments; 
Holland; 
Nebraska 
Bormes   
Dyk  Arctic Slope; 
Resource 
Agredano; 
Nebraska 
 
Moore ATK Thiokol; 
Bormes; 
McHugh; 
Nebraska 
   
Linn Donley; 
Nebraska 
Maropakis   
Gajarsa  Pai Corp Nebraska 
Michel  Nebraska    
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Senior Judges 
Clevenger Agredano; 
Donley; 
Sullivan 
   
Mayer Precision Pine; 
Nebraska 
Agredano   
Archer ATK Thiokol    
Friedman McHugh    
Plager Sullivan  
Schall Nebraska    
Kendall230 Resource    
 
                                                 
 230. District Judge sitting by designation. 
2011] 2010 GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW DECISIONS 1117 
APPENDIX B 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS ACTIVITY PER 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT JUDGE 2009–2010 COMBINED 
Judge 
Participated Without 
Writing 
Drafted 
Decision 
Concurring 
Decision 
Dissenting 
Decision 
Bryson Arctic Slope II; 
Biltmore; 
Carolina;  
Ham Investments; 
LAI Services; 
Pai Corp;  
Sullivan 
Anchor 
Savings; 
Arctic Slope I; 
Astoria; 
ATK Thiokol; 
Donley; 
Grant County; 
Nebraska; 
Savantage; 
  
Lourie Arctic Slope I; 
Arctic Slope II; 
Bank of Guam; 
Ham Investments; 
Holland; 
Maropakis; 
Nebraska; 
Precision Pine; 
Raytheon; 
Republic; 
Resource; 
States Roofing; 
Winter 
McHugh  Telecom 
Newman Alabama Aircraft; 
American Contractors; 
Anchor Savings; 
Bormes; 
Labatt; 
Maropakis; 
Nebraska; 
Savantage; 
Stockton 
Slattery; 
States Roofing 
 Bell 
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Prost Centech; 
Nebraska; 
Pai Corp; 
Savantage; 
Telecom 
Axiom; 
Bell; 
Holland; 
Precision Pine; 
Winter 
  
Rader Anchor Savings; 
Arko; 
Astoria; 
Bell; 
Centech; 
Ham Investments; 
Holland; 
Nebraska; 
Tyler Const; 
Weeks Marine 
Bormes; 
Carolina 
  
Dyk Arko; 
Astoria; 
First Home 
American 
Contractors; 
Arctic Slope II; 
Biltmore; 
Daewoo; 
Resource; 
Telecom 
Agredano; 
Nebraska 
Weeks Marine 
Moore Alabama Aircraft; 
ATK Thiokol; 
Bormes; 
McHugh; 
Moore; 
Nebraska 
   
Linn Axiom; 
Donley; 
Grant County; 
LAI Services; 
Nebraska 
Maropakis   
Gajarsa Bank of Guam; 
Stockton 
First Home; 
Pai Corp; 
Raytheon 
 Nebraska; 
Slattery 
Michel  Nebraska; 
States Roofing; 
Tip Top; 
Winter 
McDonnell   
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Schall American Contractors; 
Grant County; 
Labatt; 
Nebraska; 
Republic 
Bank of 
Guam; 
Centech; 
LAI Services; 
Weeks Marine 
  
Senior Judges 
Clevenger Agredano; 
Donley; 
Sullivan 
Republic   
Mayer Arctic Slope I; 
Carolina; 
Daewoo; 
First Home; 
Nebraska; 
Precision Pine; 
Raytheon; 
Tyler Const 
Agredano; 
Labatt 
  
Archer ATK Thiokol  
Friedman Daewoo; 
McHugh 
Tyler Const   
Plager Biltmore; 
Sullivan 
Alabama 
Aircraft; 
Stockton 
  
Judges Sitting By Designation 
Arterton231 Axiom    
Huff232 McDonnell    
Kendall233 Resource  
Posner234 Tip Top    
Walker235  Arko  
Ward236  Slattery    
 
                                                 
 231. District Judge sitting by designation. 
 232. District Judge sitting by designation. 
 233. District Judge sitting by designation 
 234. Circuit Judge sitting by designation. 
 235. Chief District Judge sitting by designation. 
 236. District Judge sitting by designation. 
